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ABSTRACT 
Religious organizations (ROs) in Pakistan have a socio-economic link with society 
because these institutions provide public goods and welfare to society. Members of 
society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these 
institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to 
the political and social context in the country. They then use this socio-economic link to 
indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of 
terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs to mobilize society for 
their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass 
extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable 
segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for 
the state’s interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that 
require adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which further contribute to 
extremism. 
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 xiv 
I. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN 
On 15 October 2005, within a week after the devastating earthquake that killed 
approximately 73,0001 people in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)2 and Azad 
Kashmir, Jama’at ud Dawa (JUD), a religious organization banned by the United States 
in 2003 as operating as an organized group with links to terrorists in Pakistan, had 
established relief camps and field hospitals equipped with X-ray machines and makeshift 
operation theaters.3 The organization was also effective in relief work during the refugee 
crisis emerging from Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations in Swat and humanitarian 
disaster after the floods in 2009 and 2010, respectively.4 Despite being declared a 
terrorist organization by the international community, the Pakistani government 
supported and continues to support such extremist religious organizations.  
JUD is an extremist organization, which was identified by the United States in 
2003 as having links with terrorist organizations. Pakistan also placed the organization on 
its terrorism watchlist in late 2003.5 In 2009, the Pakistan government put a ban on JUD 
after the United Nations declared it as a terrorist group.6 At the same time, the 
organization was able to receive millions of rupees in funding from the provincial 
government in Punjab.7 State support for such organizations often raises the question of 
1 UNICEF, “UNICEF Pakistan Support to Recovery and Rehabilitation of Basic Social Services for 
the Earthquake-Affected Population 2007‒2008,” UNICEF, 1 September 2007, www.unicef.org/pakistan/
Overview-Updated-September-2007-1_(2).pdf.  
2 The province of NWFP has been renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in April 2010, see Sama 
TV, “Senate Approved Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Name of NWFP,” Sama TV, 15 April 2010, 
http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/15-Apr-2010/senate-approved-khyber-pakhtoonkhwa-name-of-nwfp.  
3 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Extremists Fill Aid Chasm after Quake,” Washington Post, 16 
October 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/
AR2005101501392.html.  
4 Rob Crilly, “Pakistan Flood Aid from Islamic Extremists,” Telegraph, 21 August 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7957988/Pakistan-flood-aid-from-Islamic-
extremists.html; Declan Walsh, “Banned Jihadi Group is Running Aid Programme for Swat Refugees,” 
Guardian, 13 May 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/13/pakistan-aid-terrorism.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Bill Roggio, “UN Declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group,” Long War Journal (11 
December 2008), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un_declares_jamaatud.php#. 
7 News report, “Sherry Rehman Resents Grant Given to Jamaat ud Dawa,” Express Tribune, 18 June 
2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/22210/sherry-rehman-resents-grant-given-to-jamaat-ud-dawa/. 
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the government’s intentions and “double faced” policy. Yet very little research has been 
done on why that is the case. Understanding the imperatives that push the state into 
supporting these groups at times is critical for understanding religious extremism in 
Pakistan, which is the foundation of terrorism in Pakistan. How and why are these 
organizations spreading extremism despite state attempts to control them? 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis intends to answer the question of how religious organizations in 
Pakistan contribute to extremism in society. In doing so, it will focus on selective 
religious organizations (ROs), how and why these institutions have become more extreme 
in their ideology, and what is the historical context, including external and internal 
influences, that has led to extremism. Moreover, this thesis will examine the ROs’ 
influence on and connections to civil society. It is also important to understand the state’s 
relationship with the ROs in order to see what kind of leverage it exercises on the ROs, 
and vice versa, as well how the ROs’ demands shape the state’s responses. Such a study 
will enable an understanding of ROs’ influence on Pakistani national politics.  
Religious organizations in Pakistan have a significant influence over particular 
segments of society, which they can mobilize for their objectives, and at times, this 
mobilization is quite violent, as shown by anti-Musharraf protests and others in 2005 and 
2008.8 This influence is due to the fact that the ROs in Pakistan have extensive socio-
economic welfare programs through which they offer free education along with free 
boarding and lodging in madrasas (religious schools).9 Some ROs also organize 
weddings and arrange for burials for the poor.10 Moreover, a few ROs run charity 
8 News report, “Thousands Protest in Pakistan,” Guardian, 19 December 2004, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/20/pakistan. 
9 Christopher M. Blanchard, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background (CRS Report No. 
RS21654) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 23 January 2007): 4, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RS21654.pdf.  
10 Masooda Bano, “Marker of Identity: Religious Political Parties and Welfare Work—The Case of 
Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” Research and Development Research Program, Working 
Paper 34, University of Oxford (2009): 19, http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org/files/
resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1254137609_working_paper_34.pdf.  
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hospitals and pay for healthcare for those who cannot afford it. Laurence R. Iannaccone 
and Eli Berman observe that: 
From Egypt and Palestine to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, radical 
Islamist groups have enjoyed broad support—especially among the poorer 
segments of society—because they are major suppliers of mutual aid and 
social service.11 
There appear to be several such socio-economic linkages between the ROs and 
the poor in Pakistan, because the poor often rely on ROs for education and aid at times of 
crisis. There is, however, not much empirical research done on this linkage. This 
relationship is critical for understanding politics in Pakistan. According to a report on 
Islamic parties in Pakistan published by the International Crisis Group, “they [the ROs] 
have disproportionately influenced domestic policy … through the use of street power 
and violence, often successfully pressuring civilian governments into abandoning 
promised reforms or making concessions that forward an Islamist agenda.”12 This thesis 
will explain how the ROs in Pakistan are linked to the society and have been able to rally 
public support. It also aims to cover the socio-economic aspects of the ROs—a neglected 
subject in the field of research—to find out how they impact the society.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a considerable amount of literature has emerged 
to understand Islamic radicalism and to find remedies that can effectively counter this 
threat to global security. A lot of literature has focused on the character of Islam as a 
religion and Islamic radical groups, yet very few have actually focused on the Islamic 
organizations that people come across in their daily lives. This paper proposes to fill that 
gap by looking at some of the organizations that interact with society and studying how 
they have evolved and become connected to extremists’ ideas.  
11 Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Deadly,” Public Choice 128, no. 1/2 (July 2006): 119. 
12 International Crisis Group, “Islamic Parties in Pakistan” International Crisis Group, 25, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216-islamic-parties-in-pakistan.aspx. 
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This question will also allow us to focus on extremism, which is the root of the 
problem, versus the religion itself. In the past thirteen years, scholars generally agree that 
Islam as a religion does not promote terrorism, though terrorists use religious symbols to 
link terrorism with Islam.13 Thomas J. Badey argues that “as ideologies, religions do not 
cause violence. They are systems of belief that mobilize populations toward common 
objectives and justify their behavior in the pursuit of these objectives.”14 Adam L. 
Silverman, a social science advisor to the U.S. Army, notes that, “it is clear that much of 
the so-called Islamic behavior that the West terms terrorism is outside the norms that 
Islam holds for political violence.”15 However, Islamic radicals often justify their acts of 
terrorism by propagating the idea that the fight against the West and its allied 
governments in Muslim countries is jihad.16 They argue that it is incumbent on all 
Muslims to participate in this jihad in order to be good Muslims. Most of the scholars and 
policy makers have focused on terrorism as a threat to international peace; however, it 
can be argued that terrorism is only a symptom of the deep-rooted problems of 
extremism.17 Extremist religious organizations provide the “supporting environment” to 
terrorists that provides “support and sympathy” to the terrorists.18 Emma Hooper notes 
that, “it is the failure to address extremism, militant and sectarian violence that has led to 
a vicious cycle of creeping radicalism, to a deeply disturbing extent.”19 Therefore, this 
13 Rodney Wilson, “Islam and Terrorism,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 2 (August 
2007): 203‒213, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20455506.  
14 Thomas J. Badey, “The Role of Religion in International Terrorism,” Sociological Focus 35, no. 1 
(February 2002): 84. 
15 Adam L. Silverman, “Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Islamic Norms 
for the Use of Political Violence,” Journal of Church and State 44, no.1 (Winter 2002): 91, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/59878360?accountid=12702.  
16 Bernard Lewis, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November‒December 1998): 14‒15, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049126.  
17 Todd Sandler, “New Frontiers of Terrorism Research: An Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research 
48, no. 3, Special Issue: New Frontiers of Terrorism Research (May 2011): 279‒286, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/23035427. 
18 Peter Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” 
International Social Movement Research 4 (1992): 243. 
19 Emma Hooper, “Pakistan: Back to the Future?” Notes International CIDOB 91 (June 2014), 
http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/39500/608345/file/NOTES+91_HOOPER_ANG%282%29.pdf.  
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thesis proposes to expand our understanding of the causes of extremism and 
organizations that then transfer it to society.   
In the studies of terrorism and extremism, Pakistan has gained special attention 
because of its “frontline” position and proximity to Afghanistan, and its involvement in 
the Soviet-Afghan War, which produced some of the extremists the world is confronting 
today.20 Terrorists continue to use Pakistan’s porous borders to move between the local 
population of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which undermines the U.S. and Pakistan’s 
efforts to combat these terrorists.21 It is therefore important to understand how these 
terrorists get support from society. A detailed study of selected ROs in Pakistan will 
broaden our understanding of what is occurring at the grassroots societal level in 
Pakistan. 
A study conducted by the Pew Research Center finds Pakistan among the top ten 
countries with very high social hostilities involving religion.22 While ROs might not 
agree with the use of violent tactics by the terrorists, they do, however, support the 
overarching agenda of enforcing Sharia law in the country because they believe that 
religious laws will alleviate poverty and injustice. This thesis will attempt to make that 
connection clear and show that a society that supports the ROs also ends up supporting 
terrorist organizations that are involved in anti-state activities. Thomas J. Badey 
comments that religious ideologies can become a way of organizing hatred against 
existing social and political systems.23  
Religious extremism also leads to sectarian violence, which has claimed 
thousands of lives in Pakistan. A report by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 
notes that up to 4000 people have died in sectarian violence between mid-1980s and early 
20 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 618, Terrorism: What the Next President Will Face (July 2008): 32. 
21 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (New 
York: Viking, 2012). 
22 Brian J. Grim, “Rising Restrictions on Religion: One-third of the World’s Population Experiences 
an Increase,” Pew Research Center (August 2011): 16‒17, http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/
Issues/Government/RisingRestrictions-web.pdf.  
23 Badey, “The Role of Religion in International Terrorism,” 84. 
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2000s.24 Between 2007 and 2011, there was a sharp increase in sectarian terrorism, which 
claimed the lives of 1,649 people.25 Therefore, religious extremism is a serious threat to 
Pakistan’s internal security.  
Religious organizations in Pakistan have become more extreme in their ideology 
while maintaining considerable influence in society. They draw their strength from their 
connection to a sizeable segment of society through which they exert pressure on the state 
to adopt extremist policies. The role of ROs in making Pakistan an Islamic state is well 
known; their subsequent success in pressurizing Z.A. Bhutto to declare Ahmedis as non-
Muslims and include clauses in 1973 constitution to enforce Sharia law is also widely 
known.26 Later, in 1983, General Zia accepted their demand of passing Hudood 
Ordinance, which restricts women’s rights.27 ROs in Pakistan are a significant factor, 
which have compelled the state to adopt extremist policies and influence society. This 
thesis will demonstrate that these ROs, over a period-of-time, have become more extreme 
in their ideology because of specific external and internal reasons, such as the Soviet-
Afghan War and hyper competition among the Pakistani elite. This thesis will then 
illustrate their social links that propagate extremism in society, as well as their influence 
in state activities. 
The socio-economic link between ROs and society is understudied in academia, 
as is the reason some organizations promote extreme ideas. This gap in research restricts 
our understanding of how some ROs contribute to expanding extremism in society and 
how the state then responds to this. This thesis will try to cover the gap by establishing 
the socio-economic link between ROs and society and how that contributes to overall 
extremism. 
24 Huma Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre (July 2012): 3, www.peacebuilding.no/.../949e7f9b2db9f947c95656e5b54e389e.pdf.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Riaz Hassan, “Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (July 1985): 264, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283071?origin=JSTOR-
pdf.  
27 Ibid., 268. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Since the beginning of the American-led Global War on Terror, there has been a 
lot of research on terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism.28 Yet, most of it can be put in 
the category of research on political groups that are fighting the state or the U.S. (for 
example, Al Qaida and Taliban). Such research does not, however, answer the very 
important question of how society is connected to the ROs, which is essential for 
understanding the constraints on the state as well shaping state behavior. Without 
understanding what connects terrorists and Pakistani society, we may not understand 
what the Pakistani state can do and what it cannot. This literature review therefore will 
first review literature on terrorism and extremism, and then specifically on Pakistan and 
its society, in order to understand what is needed in terms of further research.  
1. Rational Choice Approach as a Foundation 
This thesis will use the rational choice approach to explain the link between ROs 
and the society. The rational choice approach is based on the premise that “within the 
limits of their information and understanding, restricted by available options, guided by their 
preferences and tastes, humans attempt to make rational choices.”29 This thesis will see ROs 
as rational actors who try to maximize their benefits by increasing their membership. The 
religious organizations operate in a mutually competitive environment and strive for 
monopoly over religion because the group that will have the monopoly would be the 
legitimate representative of religion in the country. This will also give that group the 
authority and legitimacy to influence the state to pass policies in favor of the RO. The 
rational choice approach explains that the mutually competitive environment causes ROs to 
promote extremism.30 
It can be argued that all organizations behave rationally, but it is important to 
contextualize the ROs through the rational choice approach because this will explain why 
28 Sandler, “New Frontiers of Terrorism.” 
29 Stephen Sharot, “Beyond Christianity: A Critique of the Rational Choice Theory of Religion from a 
Weberian and Comparative Religions Perspective,” Sociology of Religion 63, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 429, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/57145309?accountid=12702.  
30 Kent D. Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations,” Strategic Management 
Journal 23, no. 5 (May 2002): 438, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094476?origin=JSTOR-pdf.  
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the ROs behave in a certain way. For example, rational choice explains why some of the 
ROs promote extremism and why they strive to increase their support. Other social 
theories about religious extremism are also important to understand why individuals 
adopt a particular religion or sect, but this thesis is focused on organizations rather than 
individuals, and therefore it will be appropriate to view the ROs as rational actors in a 
market place of ideologies. This will help in an objective understanding of ROs to 
explain how some extremist ROs contribute to extremism. 
Laurence R. Iannaccone, who took the rational choice theory beyond individuals 
to organizations, proposes that “religious ‘producers’ are also viewed as optimizers—
maximizing members, net resources, government support, or some other basic 
determinant of institutional success.”31 Therefore, the ROs will be discussed in terms of 
producers, which aim to maximize benefits to achieve their objectives. Similarly, society 
and state will also be depicted as rational actors trying to maximize their gains. It may be 
noted that this thesis will not contextualize religion, per se, as an economic commodity as 
some proponents of the Rational Choice Theory of Religion suggest.32 Rather, this argues 
that ROs, society and the state operate in a competing market place and that the ROs 
struggle among each other to be the most profitable producer. In doing so, they compete 
for more support from society and thus become an attractive commodity for the state to 
reach out to the general masses. ROs in Pakistan can be explained under this framework 
as they compete to be relevant to the state by expanding their influence over society. In 
doing so, they promote exclusionary ideologies and contribute to extremism. This 
research will further show how the competition among the ROs leads to promoting 
extremism in society, how much influence these ROs have on Pakistani society, and what 
segment or class of society supports ROs and why. What leverage do these institutions 
31 Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to 
Religion,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34, no. 1 (March 1995): 77, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/1386524. 
32 See, for example, Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert F. Hébert, “Interest Groups, Public Choice and 
the Economics of Religion,” Public Choice 142, no. 3/4, Essays in Honor of Robert D. Tollison (March 
2010): 429‒436, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40541978; see also Steve Bruce, “Religion and Rational 
Choice: A Critique of Economic Explanations of Religious Behavior,” Sociology of Religion 54, no. 2, 
Theory and History in the Study of Religion (Summer 1993): 193‒205; and Roger Finke and Laurence R. 
lannaccone, “Supply Side Explanations for Religious Change,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 527 (May 1993): 27–39. 
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have on the state policies? Why does the state respond to the demands of these socially 
influential institutions to make extremist legislation? Answers to these questions will 
explain how the ROs in Pakistan have been able to promote extremism. 
2. Religious Extremism 
Most of the literature uses religious extremism and fundamentalism 
interchangeably; however, Douglas Pratt argues that there is an important distinction 
between these two concepts.33  According to Pratt, “extremism suggests fanaticism” 
whereas fundamentalism relates to religio-political perspective found in many—if not 
all—major religions in the contemporary world.34 The difference between extremism and 
terrorism is also evident from a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute 
whereby 10 percent of Pakistanis believed that terrorism was the most important issue, 
whereas 74 percent said that extremism was the most serious issue.35 Lynn Davies 
observes that extremism is a derivative of fundamentalism, and that “the extremist’s 
mindset revolves around an absolutist claim to an authentic truth, coupled with the steady 
rejection of opposing opinions and beliefs.”36 A better definition of extremism, attributed 
to Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s debate in Doha, Qatar, defines extremism as “when you 
do not allow for a different point of view; when you hold your own views as being quite 
exclusive, when you don’t allow for the possibility of difference.”37 This definition 
describes a broader conception of religious intolerance that leads to violence and poses a 
security challenge. This thesis will use the aforementioned definition given by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu because not all ROs are extremist organizations; some of 
them are just merely fundamentalists and this thesis will specifically focus on those.  
33 Douglas Pratt, “Religion and Terrorism: Christian Fundamentalism and Extremism,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 22, no.3 (2010): 438‒456, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546551003689399.   
34 Ibid. 
35 International Republican Institute, “IRI Releases Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion International 
Republican Institute (IRI),” http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-survey-pakistan-
public-opinion-7. 
36 Dina Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 4 (2013): 69, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/4.  
37 Lynn Davies, Education against Extremism (Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2008). 
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3. Religious Extremism in Pakistan 
Various scholars have approached religious extremism in Pakistan since 
September 11. Some of the scholars explain religious extremism in Pakistan because of 
military rule and an alliance between the military and religious militants to pursue 
security objectives and to legitimize the military’s rule. Vali Nasr argues that military 
rulers made alliances with the ROs to legitimize their rule.38 Hussain Haqqani also 
highlights the role of military in supporting religious groups for its own interests.39 S. 
Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly support Haqqani’s findings and argue that the use of 
militancy “is the centerpiece of a sophisticated asymmetric warfare campaign.”40 These 
scholars argue that because the military regime needs legitimization, they make alliances 
with the ROs to grant themselves divine legitimacy. The military in Pakistan trained 
militants to fight against the Soviets during Soviet-Afghan War. To accomplish that, the 
military used the ROs as recruitment agencies. This thesis acknowledges that the state has 
been using ROs to promote jihad against the infidel communists in Afghanistan. This 
thesis will explore why the state needs ROs to legitimize its rule and pursue security 
objectives through them. While these scholars point to an important factor that elevated 
these organizations and even made them extreme, it does not really explain the societal 
support for these organizations, which then translates into extremism at the home front. 
Another explanation of religious extremism relating it to foreign interventions and 
influences come from scholars like Aburish Said and Noam Chomsky.41 These scholars 
argue that militant extremism is partially a response to foreign occupation and influences 
in Muslim countries. This thesis builds on this explanation, because of the prevalent 
militant struggle against occupation in Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They 
38 Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 2 
(Spring 2004): 196, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330001?origin=JSTOR-pdf.  
39 Hussain Ḥaqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2005). 
40 Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly,”The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia.” 
International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 111‒141, http://muse.jhu.edu/.  
41 Said Aburish, A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite (London: Indigo, 1997); Noam 
Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 
1983); and Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 
House, 2005). 
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further argue that the extremist ROs in other countries use the sentiments of their 
population against occupation in other countries to mobilize support for themselves. For 
example, ROs in Pakistan ask for donations for jihad in other countries. Interestingly, 
their expenditure is not auditable and there is no proof that whether such funds were used 
for supporting jihad against foreign interventions or were consumed by the ROs to spread 
extreme views in their own country. This thesis argues that such ROs strive to acquire 
resources to increase their strength and support from society so that they can get 
concessions from the state. It will further demonstrate that such ROs promote extremism 
by calling for jihad in other countries and recruiting militants who can be used by these 
extremist ROs for their own purposes. 
Significant research on extremism in Pakistan is focused on the role of madrasas 
(religious schools) in promoting extremism. Commentators such as Jessica Stern, Alan 
Richards, Hussain Haqqani, Ahmed Rashid, and Ali Riaz are a few of the scholars who 
draw a causal link between madrasas and extremism in Pakistan.42 This school of 
thought argues that madrasas have been indoctrinating young students with radical Islam. 
However, such claims have been refuted by scholars like Tahir Andarabi et al., Tariq 
Rahman, and Christine Fair who argue that madrasas have been unfairly blamed for 
promoting extremism and that these religious schools instead provide social services by 
educating the underprivileged.43 Tahir Andrabi et al. have collected data on madrasas 
and students who enroll in these seminaries. The data shows that the numbers of 
42 Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 6 (November–December 2000): 
115‒126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049971; see also Jessica Stern, “Preparing for a War on 
Terrorism,” Current History 100, no. 649 (2001): 355‒357; Alan Richards, “At War with Utopian 
Fanatics,” Middle East Policy 8, no. 4 (2001); Hussain Haqqani, “Islam’s Medieval Outposts,” Foreign 
Policy 133 (November–December 2002): 58‒64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183558; See also Ahmed 
Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008); and Ali Riaz, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Teaching 
the Alphabets of Jihad,” Working Paper No. 85, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, 
www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP85.pdf. 
43 Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, “Religious School Enrollment in 
Pakistan: A Look at the Data.” Comparative Education Review 50, no. 3, Special Issue on Islam and 
Education—Myths and Truths, ed. Wadad Kadi and Victor Billeh (August, 2006): 446‒477, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/503885; Tariq Rahman, “Madrassas: Religion, Poverty, and the 
Potential for Violence in Pakistan,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute 5 no. 1 (Winter 2005), 
http://www.ipripak.org/journal/winter2005/madrassas.shtml; Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, 
“Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/
10): 79‒118, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v034/34.3.shapiro.html.  
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madrasas in Pakistan are not significant and that empirical data disproves a link between 
poverty and enrollment in madrasas.44 Based on these statistics, Christine Fair argues 
that “commonly suggested palliatives intended to reduce generalized support for 
militancy—economic development, greater democratization, alternatives to religious 
education, and so on—is unlikely to be effective.”45 Andrabi and Fair’s findings have 
been challenged by scholars like Christopher Candland who observes that the number of 
madrasas in Pakistan are much more—19,104—than reported by Andrabi.46 Candland 
further argues that madrasas have played a significant role in promoting extremism.47 
But madrasas are only one aspect of charity work by ROs. Arguably, while there is no 
doubt that madrasas have played an important role in producing radical “students” such 
as the Taliban, the focus on madrasas has detracted from other links between society and 
ROs. This thesis will explore other societal links that are as critical but also hidden to 
some extent. 
Social welfare projects being run by ROs also need attention. However, little 
direct empirical data is available that can ascertain a correlation between ROs’ welfare 
work and society’s support. Jamat-i-Islami, for example, runs a welfare organization 
named Al-Khidmat that “runs hospitals, schools, women’s vocational centers, and 
emergency response units.”48 Masooda Bano argues that “converting beneficiaries 
(through welfare programs) into voters is at most a secondary concern; instead the 
primary motive for the engagement in welfare work is to win the trust of party members 
by establishing the party’s commitment to the implementation of religious precepts.”49 
This claim by Bano, however, cannot be substantiated through empirical evidence, but at 
the same time, there is no empirical research available to justify that welfare work by 
44 Andrabi, “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan.”  
45 Jacob N. Shapiro, and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in 
Pakistan,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 116, http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/
journals/international_security/v034/34.3.shapiro.pdf.  
46 Christopher Candland, “Pakistan’s Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education” in Madrasa 
in South Asia: Teaching Terror? ed. Jamal Malik (New York: Routledge, 2008): 102. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 10. 
49 Bano, “Marker of Identity,” 12. 
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ROs is intended to increase the support for ROs. Therefore, there remains a gap in 
research to understand the socio-economic influence of the welfare activities of the ROs. 
This thesis intends to cover this gap by showing that the ROs increase their support 
through welfare activities. 
A seminal work in this regard has been undertaken by the Religions and 
Development Research Program Consortium (RaD), sponsored by the UK Department of 
International Development (DFID). RaD has carried out research on Jama’at-i-Islami (JI) 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh; the aim of this research is to understand the influence of 
welfare work by ROs in society. RaD’s research explores whether the ROs perform 
welfare work to secure loyalty of its members to benefit in elections. The research is 
based on interviews with JIs’ leadership, and thus lacks empirical evidence; nonetheless, 
RaD’s study suggests that exploring the influence of welfare work by ROs is worthy of 
dedicated research on the topic.50 This thesis will establish the link between ROs’ welfare 
work and support from society. 
Unfortunately, establishing links between ROs and society through empirical data 
may not be possible because it is difficult to engage in direct field work. However, there 
is indirect evidence available through data from primary and secondary sources that was 
not intended specifically for understanding the link between ROs and society. For 
instance, newspaper articles connect ROs to charity work in regions where they have a 
stronghold. This thesis will also use data mostly from RaD’s study, polls conducted by 
the International Republican Institute, earlier work done by scholars like Andrabi et al., 
Christine Fair, Jessica Stern, and P. W. Singer.51 The data will be analyzed to understand 
the social base of ROs and to demonstrate that the welfare work by ROs significantly 
contributes to maintaining their social base. 
50 Ibid., 12. 
51 Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 6 (November‒December 2000): 
115‒126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049971; Religions and Development (RaD), 
http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org; The International Republican Institute, http://www.iri.org/
countries-and-programs/middle-east-and-north-africa/pakistan; Peter Warren Singer, “Pakistan’s 
Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,” Brookings Institution (November 2001), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/11/pakistan-singer. 
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Due to limited available data, this thesis will use the case study method by 
looking at selected ROs. Both JI and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are important organizations 
that are active in Pakistan and are well documented in the media. Moreover, JI and JUD 
have extensive networks of welfare activities through their welfare wings. Haroon K. 
Ullah, Humeira Iqtidar, Nasr, Bano, RaD, and the International Crisis Group have studied 
these two ROs in much detail and provided useful statistics that can be used for analysis 
in this thesis.52 
This thesis has academic and practical benefits. From an academic perspective, 
this work will demonstrate that the socio-economic link between ROs and the society is 
significant to understand how some of the extremist ROs garner support from society. 
This thesis will highlight the gaps in research work, which, if addressed, will broaden our 
understanding of religious extremism. From a practical perspective, this understanding 
can help in implementing sound policies aimed at minimizing the support for extremist 
ROs. In this regard, this paper can lead to better implementation of Pakistan’s recently 
formulated National Policy on counterterrorism.53 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Islamic extremism is one of the most serious security challenges facing Pakistan 
and the world. Promoting extremism in society leads to the use of violence. Sectarian 
violence and other acts of terrorism have claimed thousands of lives in Pakistan. It is 
therefore important to understand how extremism is being propagated in society. The 
causes of extremism in Pakistan have been attributed to regional wars and rivalries, 
natural sectarian divides in the country, state weakness (especially in tribal regions), 
Pakistan’s support for anti-India militants in Kashmir, and Pakistan’s co-operation with 
the United States in the War on Terror. While all of these factors contribute to extremism, 
52 Haroon K. Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and 
Extremism in Pakistan (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Humeira Iqtidar, 
Secularizing Islamists? Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-Dawa in Urban Pakistan (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Vanguard of Islamic Revolution The Jama’at-i-Islami of 
Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Religions and Development (RaD), 
http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org; and “Islamic Parties in Pakistan,” International Crisis Group, 
Working Paper No. 216. 
53 Government of Pakistan, “National Internal Security Policy 2014‒18,” http://nacta.gov.pk/#NISP.  
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this thesis hypothesizes that the supporting environment for extremism is located in the 
local ROs. This thesis shows that the abovementioned factors can motivate individuals, 
but an organized base to mobilize these individuals is essential for terrorism.  
This thesis emphasizes the role of ROs as providers of organized bases and a 
supporting environment to the disenfranchised masses, which mobilizes them as groups. 
It will be argued that the ROs capitalize on people’s grievances and fill the void created 
by the state’s ineffective social welfare programs to muster support from society. The 
ROs do so in a competitive environment to claim their monopoly over religion because 
the RO that has the monopoly over religion would be the legitimate beneficiary of the 
state’s resources. This monopoly and legitimacy will also provide that RO with an 
influence over state policy.54 Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of this 
relationship. 
 
Figure 1.  State, Society, and ROs’ Relation. 
This thesis hypothesizes that the ROs in Pakistan have a socio-economic linkage 
with society because these institutions provide public goods and welfare to society. 
Members of society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become 
supporters of these institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted 
extreme views due to the political and social context in the country. They then use this 
socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a 
foundational acceptance of terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs 
54 Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics?” 77. 
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to mobilize society for their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or 
compel the state to pass extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their 
influence over a considerable segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs 
to mobilize the population for the state’s interest. Therefore, the state accepts the 
demands of ROs—including those that require adoption and implementation of extremist 
laws. The following model explains the links among ROs, society, and the state:  
Religious extremism is one of the most serious security challenges for Pakistan. 
Extremism in society allows for more radicalization that leads to the use of violence. It is 
therefore important to understand how extremism is being propagated in society. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will use JI and JUD as a case study to demonstrate that ROs in 
Pakistan have considerable influence on society because of their socio-economic links. At 
the time of independence, JI was the most prominent religious organization in Pakistan. 
JI was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawwdudi in 1941, and since then it has 
maintained substantial support in terms of street power.55 Meanwhile, JUD is known to 
be the new front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba.56 Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the founder of the 
organization, started Jamaat-ud-Dawa in 2002 after Lashkar was banned by the Pakistani 
government.57 JUD also enjoys significant support from society and runs many charity 
works, which will be discussed in later chapters. This study of JI and JUD will illustrate 
the influence of ROs on society because they have been instrumental in compelling the 
state to adopt extremist policies, such as the declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims in 
1974, and the passing of the Hudood Ordinance in 1983.58 JI is also the largest and the 
55 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 3. 
56 “Pakistan Gave Funds to Group on UN Terror Blacklist,” BBC South Asia, http://www.bbc.com/
news/10334914.  
57 Roggio, “UN Declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group.” 
58 The Objectives Resolution of 1948 provided basic guidelines for formulating the constitution of the 
newly created state of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution demanded that all laws of the country must be 
made in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The 1973 constitution was formulated under these broad 
guidelines, but it explicitly included clauses related to the Islamic character of the state and declared that 
Sharia laws were to be implemented in the country. The Hudood Ordinance of 1983 implemented Sharia 
law as interpreted by the Sunni Sect. See James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York: 
Infobase Publishing, 2009), 171, 207, 216. 
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most organized RO with an expansive network of welfare activities throughout the 
country.  
The social welfare work being done by these organizations will be studied to 
understand the economic link between these ROs and society. The geographical location 
of welfare activities will be connected to social support for JI and JUD from these areas. 
This thesis will demonstrate that the areas where these ROs provide welfare goods are 
more prone to accept their ideology. Surveys conducted by RaD and Fair will be 
analyzed to make such a correlation, which will show how ROs influence society.59  
The evolution of JI and JUD into more hardline ideological organizations will 
also be examined. This thesis will explore why these ROs became more extreme in their 
ideology. Was it because of the demand from the society or a response to state policies? 
It will be argued that ulema (religious clerics) and religious organizations had co-existed 
with other religious communities in the subcontinent for centuries, but during the latter 
half of the twentieth century, they have increasingly become intolerant of other religions 
and sects. This thesis will explore the reasons why these ROs have changed their 
ideologies from relative tolerance to extremism.60  
The thesis will also attempt to understand the relationship between JI, JUD and 
the state. It will be demonstrated that the state has provided significant concessions to the 
demands by these ROs, such as adopting an Islamic constitution, declaring Ahmedis as 
non-Muslims and implementing Sharia law through the Hudood Ordinance. This thesis 
will argue that such intolerant policies by the state add to the overall environment of 
extremism because exclusionary policies can lead to violent responses from minorities.61  
59 C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support 
for Political Violence in Pakistan.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 712, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41684595; Bano, “Marker of Identity.” 
60 Kfir, “Sectarian Violence”; Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism”; and 
Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations.” 
61 Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007); Ashutosh Misra, “Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and 
Prospects,” Strategic Analysis 27, no. 2 (2003), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160308450083; and Vali R. 
Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 
1979–1998,” Comparative Politics 32, no.2 (2000). 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis will focus on JI and JUD to demonstrate the role of ROs in 
contributing toward extremism in Pakistan. The paper will be divided in five chapters to 
answer these three essential questions: How are ROs linked with society? Why have ROs 
become more extreme in their ideology? How does the state respond to ROs?  
Chapter II examines historical links between the religious organizations and 
society. This chapter will demonstrate the ROs (specifically, JI and JUD) that have 
maintained socio-economic links with a segment of society through welfare activities. 
Since the state has failed to provide basic social necessities, the ROs fill the void, which 
enables them to maintain influence over parts of society. Hence, they are able to 
influence groups and have support among the people, which affects state-society 
relations. 
Chapter III investigates reasons for increasing extremism in religious 
organizations in Pakistan. It will be argued that the ROs had been relatively tolerant 
organizations and had co-existed with other religious communities in the subcontinent. 
After Pakistan gained Independence, the ROs saw an opportunity to establish influence 
over the state to make it a purely Islamic country. Despite the existence of these religious 
organizations since Independence, Pakistan did not see much religious terrorism until the 
end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1980s. This chapter will examine the reasons for 
extremism in ROs, which come from domestic and foreign sources.  
Chapter IV looks at the relations between the state and the ROs. This chapter 
illustrates that the state has needed the ROs to mobilize support in society. Since ROs 
have the power to garner street support from the society, they have been able to bargain 
with the state, which needs their support. This chapter will draw upon four significant 
events that demonstrate the state’s acquiescence to the demands of ROs. These events 
include the Islamic character of the 1973 constitution, the passing of legislation to declare 
Ahmedis as non-Muslims, the implementation of Sharia law through the Hudood 
Ordinance, and the Afghan-Soviet war. This chapter explains that the state’s acceptance 
of extremist policies also contributes to extremism because such policies exclude 
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minority religions and sects that make these groups feel marginalized and forces them to 
resort to violence to fight for their rights.  
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II. LINKAGE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN 
PAKISTAN AND THE POOR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the role of ROs in Pakistan, it is important to explain how 
the ROs in Pakistan have maintained links to the society. This chapter will explain how 
the ROs in Pakistan are linked to the society and how they have been able to rally public 
support. Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate that the ROs in Pakistan are linked to 
the poor through their social services and welfare activities. Their influence on the poor 
makes them politically important for the state because the state needs these religious 
groups to mobilize the poor. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
discusses the historical legacies of charity work by the ROs. ROs in Pakistan have a 
legacy of conducting social welfare activities, which connects them with the poor. The 
second section will use JUD and JI to describe how these organizations are linked to the 
poor through their welfare programs. The third section explains that the ROs maintain 
their links to the poor to expand their influence by increasing the number of their 
members. This, in turn, increases their significance and their influence over the state.  
The ROs in Pakistan have extensive socio-economic welfare programs through 
which they offer free education, along with room and board in madrasas.62 Some ROs 
also organize weddings and arrange for burials for the poor.63 Finally, a few ROs run 
charity hospitals. There appear to be several such socio-economic links between ROs and 
the poor in Pakistan because the poor often rely on ROs for education and for aid during 
times of crisis. There is, however, not much empirical research done on this link. This 
relationship is critical for understanding politics in Pakistan. According to a report on 
Islamic parties in Pakistan published by the International Crisis Group, “they (the ROs) 
have disproportionately influenced domestic policy…through the use of street power and 
violence, often successfully pressuring civilian governments into abandoning promised 
62 Blanchard, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background (CRS Report No. RS21654) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 23, 2007). 
63 Bano, “Marker of Identity,” 19.  
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reforms or making concessions that forward an Islamist agenda.”64 According to Zahid 
Hussain, a journalist, “the disturbing reality is that radical Islamic elements have as 
much—if not more—power over Pakistani society than the state.”65 It is therefore 
important to explore how ROs in Pakistan have maintained their influence over society.  
Pakistan is facing an internal security threat from religious extremism in the shape 
of sectarian violence and the struggle by some religious groups to establish control over 
the state. This struggle has been violent and has claimed thousands of lives.66 It is 
therefore important to understand the historical context of religious groups in Pakistan 
and their connection to the population to better understand where these religious groups 
draw their support from and why. Such understanding can persuade policy makers to 
provide welfare to the poor, thereby cutting off the support for extremist religious groups.    
B. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF CHARITY WORK BY ROs IN PAKISTAN 
A study conducted by the Religion and Development Research Program notes that 
there is a historical link between religion and welfare activities in the subcontinent.67 
Religions in the area now called Pakistan have influenced charity work for over five 
centuries.68 Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Sikhism, and Islam have influenced their 
followers to take care of the poor, sick, and under-privileged populations of society.69 
Specifically, in the Muslim dominated areas of the subcontinent—from the eighth to the 
eighteenth century—mosques, madrasas, and khanqahs (Sufi monasteries) were 
64 International Crisis Group, “Islamic Parties in Pakistan” International Crisis Group, i, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216-islamic-parties-in-pakistan.aspx, 25. 
65 Zahid Hussain, “The Construction and Deconstruction of Pakistan: The Institutional Writ of the 
State,” CIDOB Policy Research Project (June 2014): 10, http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/
39741/609867/file/JUNE+2014_ZAHID+HUSSAIN.pdf.  
66 Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” 3.  
67 Muhammed Asif Iqbal and Saima Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain: The Activities of Faith-Based 
Organizations in Development in Pakistan,” Religion and Development (RaD) Working Paper 24 (2008): 
15, http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/
1229940021_working_paper_24___web_file.pdf.  
68 Muhammad Asif Iqbal, Hina Khan, and Surkhab Javed, “Nonprofit Sector in Pakistan: Historical 
Background,” The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project Pakistan, SPDC Working Paper 
no. 4 (2004): 5, http://www.adm-cf.com/jhu/pdfs/CNP/CNP_NPS4_Pakistan.pdf.  
69 Ibid. 
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established as philanthropic institutions.70 Asif Iqbal et al. comment that “the most 
striking trend in the field of charity and social welfare emerges from a mystical 
movement within Muslims called Sufism,” which entered the subcontinent from West 
and Central Asia during the eleventh century.71 Iqbal and Siddiqui note that the Sufi 
khanqahs provided social services, such as food, for both their inhabitants and the local 
population, regardless of caste, creed, or race.72 ROs therefore have maintained a link 
with the poor through their social work. 
In 1894, the British Raj in the subcontinent tried to limit the work of Islamic 
charities and brought the waqf (religious endowments) under the control of central 
government.73 Dr. Jennifer Bremer, Director of the Washington Center of the Frank 
Hawkins Kennan Institute of Private Enterprise, argues that these moves by the British 
“challenged local elites and reduced their social and economic power relative to that of 
colonial powers.”74 It can be argued that the British colonizers were aware of the social 
influence of the religious welfare organizations and wanted to limit it, but the local 
Muslim elites fought against these limitations imposed on their social support base. 
After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the waqf system remained intact, but the 
first military regime felt threatened by the potential of ROs to use shrines and 
endowments to mobilize support against military rule. Bremer observes that 
70 Ibid., 7; Khanqahs are Sufi monasteries where disciples of the Pirs (spiritual leaders in Sufism) live 
and study religion. Khanqahs are similar to madrasas, but follow the Sufi doctrine of mystic beliefs. 
71 Ibid., 8–9; Sufism is a mystical movement within Islam that seeks to find divine love and 
knowledge through direct personal experience of God. It consists of a variety of mystical paths that are 
designed to ascertain the nature of mankind and God and to facilitate the experience of divine love and 
wisdom in the world. Sufism arose as an organized movement among different groups who found orthodox 
Islam to be spiritually stifling. The practices of contemporary Sufi orders and suborders vary, but most 
include the recitation of the name of God or of certain phrases from the Quran as a way to enable the soul 
to experience the higher reality. Though Sufi practitioners have often been at odds with the mainstream of 
Islamic theology and law, the importance of Sufism in the history of Islam is incalculable. Sufi literature, 
especially poetry depicting the love of God, represents a golden age in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu 
languages. See Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, 1839, www.books.google.com/books?isbn=1593394926.   
72 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping Terrain,” 16. 
73 Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (New 
Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1998), 56. 
74 Jennifer Bremer “Islamic Philanthropy: Reviving Traditional Forms of Building Social Justice,” 
paper presented at The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy presented at the annual conference at 
Washington, DC, May 2004, 14, https://www.csidonline.org/documents/pdf/5th_Annual_Conference-
Bremer_paper.pdf.  
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“Pakistan…entered independence with its Islamic endowment system largely intact.”75 
After the independence of Pakistan, ROs continued their charity work by delivering 
social goods to the poor and needy people in society. But during the first military rule 
(1958–1971), the Sufi shrines and associated waqf were placed under the control of the 
Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs.76 Iqbal and Siddiqui argue that: 
This may have been a means of controlling any possible threats to the 
military establishment that could have developed through the congregation 
of large group of people at the shrines, as these gatherings provided 
politicians with opportunities to muster support.77 
Katherine Ewing, a scholar on religious practices in Islam, notes that “leaders of 
Pakistan have found that the organizational structure of the shrines, traditionally 
maintained by hereditary living pirs, is a force that hampers their efforts to control the 
political and social organization of the country.”78 Pir in Sufi tradition is a spiritual 
leader who is believed to be closer to the God by virtue of his piety. Pir Pagaro in Sind is 
an example of how influential his followers can be. Pir Pagaro has traditionally had a 
large following in Sind and its surrounding areas. The followers of Pir Pagaro are called 
Hurs; they are willing to lay down their lives for him.79 The Hurs, under the leadership of 
Pir Pagaro, staged two rebellions against the British, one in the 1890s and again in the 
1940s; during the second rebellion, Sabghatullah Shah was the Pir Pagaro.80 The British 
executed him in 1943 because they saw him as a threat to their administration.81 It can be 
argued that the religious leaders such as pirs can influence the population through socio-
welfare networks of shrines or kahnqahs to rally support against the ruling regime. 
Therefore, ROs have the potential to mobilize masses through their socio-welfare linkage 
with society. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 18. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Katherine Ewing, “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan,” Journal of Asian 
Studies 42, no. 2 (February 1983): 251, doi: 10.2307/2055113.  




                                                 
During the military rule of General Zia ul Haq (1977–1988), the ROs increased in 
numbers and expanded their scope. Iqbal and Siddiqui observe that, “against the 
backdrop of Zia’s Islamization drive, alongside the Afghan War (1979–1989), and the 
liberal flow of foreign funds, the ROs flourished.”82 This period also saw an increase in 
sectarian ROs with a military outlook, which can be attributed to the growing influence 
of Saudi funding to check the spread of Iranian influence after the Iranian Revolution.83 
The increase in sectarian competition is also attributed to the phenomenon of the state’s 
support of the sect of Deobandi.84 Zia had a personal inclination toward the hardliner 
Deobandi ideology, which was not very popular in Pakistan at the time. The majority of 
the people followed the rather moderate ideology of mystic Sufism, Barelvi.85 In 2011, a 
website on global security estimated that 50 percent of the Muslim population in Pakistan 
is Barelvi, whereas 20 percent belong to the Deobandi sect.86 During the Soviet-Afghan 
War, military regime under Zia supported the Deobandis and provided them with 
substantial funds to promote jihad in Afghanistan. The funds were used to establish 
madrasas, which changed the sectarian landscape of Pakistan.87 The Deobandis, which 
have been a minority population (20 percent) as compared to the Barelvis (50 percent), 
have managed to outnumber the madrasas run by the latter.88 Moreover, Zia also 
followed the advice of JI and ulema from Deobandi ideology in formulating Islamic laws 
(such as the Hudood Ordinance), of which the minority sects did not approve.89 
82 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 19. 
83 Jon B. Alternan, “Saudi Charities and Support for Terror,” in Understanding Islamic Charities, ed. 
Jon B. Alterman and Karin Von Hippel (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(2007), 64, http://books.google.com/books?id=1QbC2rFxr24C&printsec= 
frontcover#v=onepage&q=pakistan&f=false. 
84 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: United Book Press, 
2008), 151. 
85 Ismail Khan, “The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 12, no. 56, 
https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1283/kahn_vol12.pdf. 
86 Global Security, “Barelvi Islam,” Global Security, last modified on 7 May 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm.  
87 Khan, “Assertion of Barelvi Extremism,” 56. 
88 Ashok K. Behuria, “Sects within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan,” 
Strategic Analysis 32, No.1 (January 2008). 
89 Hussain Haqqani, “Weeding Out the Heretics: Sectarianism in Pakistan,” 79, 
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Therefore, through state patronage, a sect that is in minority in terms of population has 
become more influential. It can be argued that this patronage of a particular sect by the 
state marginalized the other sects and demonstrated that the religious group that receives 
the state’s patronage would be the beneficiary of state resources and could influence state 
policies.  
It is clear from the previous discussion that ROs in Pakistan have a legacy of 
carrying out socio-economic services. Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz, an architect of the U.S. 
counterterrorism policy, puts it neatly: 
Throughout history, Islamic movements have used social movement 
organizations, like charities and mosques, which give them critical 
structures around which to build broadly-based support. Charities can 
provide critical financial resources as well as logistical support for the 
society, often filling the void created by weak state structures.90 
C. CASE OF JI AND JUD 
The ROs in Pakistan have become more organized in their welfare activities in the 
last three decades. ROs such as JI and JUD were among the key relief providers during 
the devastation caused by the 2005 earthquake and the colossal damage caused by the 
floods in 2010.91 This section will look at the welfare work done by these ROs.  
1. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) 
Jamaat-e-Islami was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawwdudi in 1941 
and has a substantial support in terms of street power.92 JI claims to have 4.5 million 
90 Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Terrorism and Islamic Extremism in the Middle East Conference 
Report,” in Conference Report on Terrorism and Islamic Extremism in the Middle East: Perspectives and 




91 Bill Roggio, “USAID Leader in Pakistan Supports Jamaat-ud-Dawa Front,” Long War Journal (26 
August 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/usaid_leader_in_paki.php#; Deutsche 
Welle, “Pakistani Islamist Groups Very Visible in the Flood-Affected Regions,” DW, 20 September 2010, 
http://www.dw.de/pakistani-islamist-groups-very-visible-in-the-flood-affected-regions/a-6023914.  
92 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 3. 
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members.93 Ullah notes that, “currently JI has roughly ten thousand affiliate members in 
Lahore and fifteen thousand affiliate members in Karachi with a goal of five million 
affiliates throughout Pakistan.”94 He also comments that “the JI’s most important 
connection to the lower classes and the rural poor comes through its charitable work.”95 
Christopher Candland argues that the welfare wing of JI, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, 
“runs approximately 90 madaris [Islamic boarding schools], provides stipends to poor 
students and funds for the marriage of daughters from poor families, and operates 
homeopathic clinics, allopathic dispensaries, and a coffin carrying service for families in 
poor areas.”96 Humeira Iqtidar argues that “no…national political party (save JI) has 
institutional links, however tenuous, with peasants or small farmers.”97 A study 
conducted by RaD shows that JI has an expansive welfare network all over Pakistan 
(Table 1). Ullah argues that this is “a result of JI’s careful organization and highly 
motivated membership.”98  
Table 1.   Institutions Run by the Al-Khidmat Foundation.99 
 
93 Christopher Candland, “Faith as Social Capital: Religion and Community Development in Southern 
Asia,” Policy Sciences 33, no. 3/4, Social Capital as a Policy Resource (2000): 362, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/4532509. 
94 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 84. 
95 Ibid., 85. 
96 Candland, “Faith as Social Capital,” 362. 
97 Humeira Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists? Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-Dawa in Urban 
Pakistan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011): 79. 
98 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 85. 
99 Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 30. 
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Al-Khidmat also works with its sister organizations to provide mainstream 
education and organize professional associations such as the Ghazali Education Trust 
with 267 school education 60,000 students, the Rural Education and Development 
(READ) foundation, which provides education to 60,000 children through 323 schools in 
rural areas, the Al-Khidmat Khawateen (women) Trust, which provides various social 
services to women, and the Pakistan Islamic Medical Association (PIMA) with a 
membership of 3,500 doctors.100 Candland observes that JI “emphasizes education of 
young people so as to favorably influence them toward Jamaat-i-Islami thinking.”101 It 
can therefore be argued that the social work by JI is aimed at expanding their ideology 
and broadening their support. 
Al-Khidmat has also been prominent in providing relief goods and services during 
times of crisis. Ullah notes that the foundation “was widely praised for its relief efforts 
following the devastating 2010 floods, when it deployed thousands of relief workers 
across some of the hardest-hit areas of Pakistan.”102 As Candland and Qazi state: 
It appears that the Jamaat i Islami set up Al Khidmat Foundation with 
political objectives. The failure of state institutions to respond to the 
victims of natural disasters and civil strife or lack of government 
commitment to the educational and health needs of the population allows 
Al Khidmat, run by accomplished Jamaat i Islami leaders, or to win public 
sympathy.103 
According to Al-Khidmat’s website, the foundation runs 163 hospitals and clinics 
all over the country, which have provided health care to more than 3.5 million people.104 
The foundation claims that the government has been unable to provide basic health care 
to the poor, but the “Alkhidmat foundation has always served the poorest and neediest 
100 Ibid., 31. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 85. 
103 Christopher Candland and Raza Khan Qazi, The Cup, the Gun and the Crescent: Social Welfare 
and Civil Unrest in Muslim Societies, ed. Sara Ashencaen Crabtree, Jonathan Parker, and Azlinda Azman 
(New York: Whiting & Birch, 2012), 112. 
104 Al-Khidmat Foundation Pakistan, official website, http://al-khidmatfoundation.org/
health/#sthash.YvE6oO2C.dpbs.  
 28 
                                                 
segment of Pakistan’s society.”105 Moreover, the website claims to have been quite 
effective in disaster relief by having provided assistance to a population of 10 million 
affected people.106 A senior Pakistani journalist, Shahzada Irfan Ahmed, and a prominent 
defense analyst, Ayesha Sidiqa note that 
The government’s inefficiency and lack of capacity to provide relief to all 
affected areas has allowed for many religious parties to spring into action 
and exploit the situation by helping victims and thereby gaining their 
confidence.107 
JI is one such religious organization that fills in the void created by the inability 
of the government to look after the needs of its population. The expansive network of 
welfare activities conducted by the welfare wing of JI allows it to increases its influence 
over society. 
2. Jamaat ud Dawa (JUD) 
JUD has a widespread welfare network through which it provides education and 
social welfare to the poor and needy. The organization has been particularly effective in 
relief work after natural disasters. Within a week after the devastating earthquake of 2005 
that killed approximately 73,000 people108 in the NWFP109 and Azad Kashmir, JUD had 
established relief camps and field hospitals equipped with X-ray machines and a 
makeshift operation theater.110 According to Samaa TV, a Pakistani news channel, “It has 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Shahzada Irfan Ahmed and Ayesha Siddiqa, “Religious Mission or Political Ambition?” Newsline, 
30 September 2010, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2010/09/religious-mission-or-political-ambition/.  
108 UNICEF, “UNICEF Pakistan Support to Recovery and Rehabilitation of Basic Social Services for 
the Earthquake-Affected Population 2007–2008,” www.unicef.org/pakistan/Overview-Updated-September-
2007-1_(2).pdf.  
109 The province of NWFP has been renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in April 2010, see Sama 
TV, “Senate Approved Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Name of NWFP,” Sama TV, http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/
15-Apr-2010/senate-approved-khyber-pakhtoonkhwa-name-of-nwfp.  




                                                 
since built 5,000 homes, 39 schools and 59 mosques there.”111 The organization was also 
effective in carrying out relief work during the refugee crisis, which emerged from both 
Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations in Swat and the humanitarian disasters after the 
floods in 2005 and 2010.112 According to Thomas K. Gugler, a German scholar who has 
written extensively on ROs in Pakistan: 
As government agencies in Pakistan cannot organize basic aid for most 
needy after catastrophes like the earthquake in October 2005 or the flood 
in July 2010, health services, relief and reconstruction work as well as 
managing displacement camps is increasingly conducted by Islamist 
organizations and the JD has become the most prominent militant outfit in 
Pakistan engaging in humanitarian work.113 
Commenting on the relief work of JUD, the Pakistani interior minister said that 
the “work of Jamaat and other Islamic groups is ‘the lifeline of our rescue and relief 
work.’”114 According to Jonathan Benthal, an anthropologist, “hard-line groups proved 
helpful not only in leveraging the response efforts of the others, but in mobilizing relief 
work through networks of madrassas and mosques.”115 Benthal notes that during the 
earthquake relief operations, JUD had supplied medicine to the army and even helped 
transport NATO soldiers across rivers in remote areas.116  
111 Samaa TV, “Pakistan to Crack Down on Jamaat-ud-Dawa,” Samaa TV, 5 December 2008, 
http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/05-Dec-2008/pakistan-to-crack-down-on-jamaat-ud-dawa.  
112 Rob Crilly, “Pakistan Flood Aid From Islamic Extremists,” Telegraph, 21 August 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7957988/Pakistan-flood-aid-from-Islamic-
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Apart from disaster-relief activities, the organization also runs many social 
welfare projects all over the country. Aoun Sahi, a Pakistani journalist, states that: 
The foundation has its charity operations in almost all parts of the country. 
They include five hospitals, 126 dispensaries, 152 blood donor societies, 
139 ambulances in 73 cities of the country, 140 schools, 40 madrassas and 
three colleges. More than 60,000 students are enrolled in the educational 
institutions of the organization.117 
JUD also organizes free medical camps in places where the government has not 
been able to provide health facilities. In February 2013, JUD organized 50 camps in 
various areas and vaccinated around 22,000 children against measles.118 According to the 
JUD website, in June 2013, “it has treated more than 20,000 patients over a period of 
three days through its free medical camps set up in various parts of Baluchistan where 
they also distributed free medicine.”119 The website also claims that JUD would reach the 
far-off areas like Tahrparkar in Sindh to provide necessities to the deprived inhabitants of 
the area.120 Such welfare activities enhance the support base for this RO, which not only 
comes from the people following their ideology, but also from the people of other 
religions who benefit from their services. This is evident from Humeira Iqtidar’s 
observation that “Hindus from inner Sindh demonstrated after the JUD was implicated in 
the Mumbai attack in 2008, protesting that the organization was a charity that helped 
them by providing food and water, and that any clamping down would have a negative 
impact.”121 
It is evident from the above discourse that JUD has an effective welfare network 
that provides the organization with leverage to connect to the poor through filling in the 
117 Aoun Sahi, “Dawa, Jihad, Charity or All? News, 15 April 2012, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/
apr2012-weekly/nos-15-04-2012/spr.htm#4.  
118 M. Waqar Bhatti, “Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Other Charities Vaccinating Children against Measles,” 
News, 15 February 2013, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-160041-Jamaat-ud-Dawa-other-
charities-vaccinating-children-against-measles.  
119 Jamat ud Dawa official website, http://judofficial.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/jamat-ud-dawah-has-
treated-more-than-20000-patients-over-a-period-of-three-days-through-its-free-medical-camps-set-up-in-
various-parts-of-baluchistan-where-they-also-distributed-free-medicines/.  
120 Bhatti, “Jamaat-ud-Dawa.” 
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void created by the government’s inability to provide social services to the masses. There 
is no surprise, then, that the JUD’s “annual congregation had attracted around one million 
visitors in 2001, most of them from lower-middle class background.”122 
D. WHY ROs CONDUCT WELFARE ACTIVITIES 
There are two explanations about the motives of ROs to carry out welfare 
activities: to fulfill a religious obligation of helping the poor or to increase their influence 
in society by attracting more members. More membership gives them influence over the 
state’s power structure. Helping the poor and the needy is obligatory for Muslims who 
have the ability to do so. Zakat, an annual subscription of 2.5 percent of accumulated 
wealth, is the mandatory donation for Muslims of a particular financial stratum. It can be 
argued that the ROs provide social welfare to meet their religious obligation. There is, 
however, a powerful benefit from providing social services, which can expand their 
influence through increase in membership. It can be argued that the poor who benefit 
from the social services of ROs are prone to support them. Gunther and Diamond argue 
that: 
Religious fundamentalist parties mobilize support not only by invoking 
religious doctrine and identity, and by proposing policies derived from 
those principles, but also through selective incentives; they often perform 
a wide range of social welfare functions which aid in recruiting and 
solidifying the loyalty of members. This web of organized activities and 
services encapsulates members within a distinct subculture. Although 
these are not class-based parties, they disproportionately attract support 
from the poor and downtrodden and the marginalized middle class, among 
whom denunciations of injustice and corruption have a particular 
resonance.123 
Similarly, Luca Ozzano, an Italian political scientist, notes that fundamentalist 
parties can be connected to ROs with a broader appeal in society.124 As a consequence of 
their social services, “they usually find their militants among frustrated and deprived 
122 Gugler, “From Kalashnikov to Keyboard.”  
123 Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties: A New Typology,” Party 
Politics 9, no. 2 (2003): 183, http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/9/2/167.full.pdf+html.  
124 Luca Ozzano, “The Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties,” 
Democratization 20, no. 5 (2013): 817, doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.801253. 
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people from middle-lower classes—usually living in rural areas and urban shantytowns—
but sometimes also among highly ideologized middle-class people.”125 Moreover, 
Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman observe that:  
From Egypt and Palestine to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, radical 
Islamist groups have enjoyed broad support—especially among the poorer 
segments of society—because they are major suppliers of mutual aid and 
social service.126 
Therefore, it can be argued that the ROs’ social welfare activities help them in 
expanding their influence over the poor. This increases their influence in society, which 
allows them to promote their ideology and mobilize segments of society for their 
objectives, such as demanding concessions or resources from the state. 
In Pakistan, where religion has been politicized, the ROs compete to establish a 
monopoly over religion because the RO that has the most control over religion would be 
the legitimate beneficiary of the state’s resources. This monopoly and legitimacy will 
also provide that RO with an influence over state policy.127 Collin J. Beck, an Assistant 
Professor of Sociology at Pomona College, argues that “state incorporation of religion 
creates religious movements through the construction of Islam as a legitimate mobilizing 
frame for political action.”128 He further comments that “a regime’s maintenance of a 
public role for Islam also allows increased access to mobilizing resources for religious 
political organizations, and the creation of a site of mobilization that is sheltered from 
political exclusion and state repression.”129 Candland argues that “in an environment in 
which religion has been highly politicized, however, it is not surprising that few 
development organizations have made use of Islamic values to generate cooperation or 
trust within the communities in which they work.”130 It can be argued that where the state 
125 Ibid. 
126 Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Deadly,” Public Choice 128, no. 1/2, The Political Economy of Terrorism (July 2006): 119. 
127 Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics?” 77. 
128 Colin J. Beck, “State Building as a Source of Islamic Political Organization,” Sociological Forum 
24, no. 2 (June 2009): 342, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40210404. 
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130 Candland, “Faith as Social Capital,” 363. 
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uses religion for political purposes, the ROs compete for a monopoly on the religion to 
acquire more resources. The role of state in politicizing ROs is discussed in Chapter IV of 
this paper. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Religious organizations in Pakistan have a history of carrying out social services 
and helping the poor. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the state sponsored a particular 
sect, which marginalized other sects. This action had a profound effect on the conduct of 
ROs, who thus became competitive in expanding their influence on society. The case of 
JI and JUD are instructive, for in order to increase their influence, the ROs engaged in 
social services. JI and JUD have expansive welfare networks all over the country. They 
have been able to provide social and welfare services in the areas where the government 
has been unable to provide such services. Therefore, these ROs have maintained their 
link with the poor. Their influence on the poor provides them with the leverage necessary 
to gain concessions and resources from the state. Therefore, the ROs remain engaged in 
competitive welfare activities to increase their influence over segments of society 
belonging to lower and lower-middle classes. It is important to understand the link 
between religious organizations and the poor to further our understanding of the 
dependence of the state on religious groups to mobilize the poor. The state has been 
unable to meet the basic social needs of the poor and therefore, the poor have become 
disenfranchised by the state and come under the influence of religious organizations. This 
situation benefits religious organizations, for they can bargain for compensation from the 
state. By realizing the link between the poor and religious organizations, the state can 
form policies to address the social requisites of the poor in order to weaken the power 
base of religious organizations. Some of these ROs have adopted extremist ideologies 
and because they maintain influence over society through socio-welfare networks, they 
promote extremism in society. Why these organizations have become extremists in their 
ideology is discussed in Chapter III. 
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III.  EXTREMISM IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
Religious extremism in Pakistan is almost as old as the country itself. Pakistan 
was formed in 1947 and experienced an initial manifestation of religious extremism in 
1953, when Majlis e Ahrar—a religious organization—demanded the state to declare 
Ahmedis as kafirs (non-Muslims).131 Pending action on their demand, Ahrar resorted to 
violent protests and riots in Punjab; they also incited killings of Ahmedis, including the 
brutal murder of an army officer.132 Incidents of such extremism through religious 
symbols have since become commonplace in Pakistan; however, it was not until the late 
1970s that the violence started increasing to an alarming level.133 This increase in 
violence was a manifestation of the extremist ideology propagated by some of the ROs. 
The adoption of extremist ideologies by some of the ROs is mostly related to the rise of 
sectarian strife during late 1970s after the Iranian Revolution and during the Afghan 
War.134 Since then, some of these religious organizations have been engaged in 
promoting the polarization of society along sectarian lines, which has led to increased 
violence and acts of terrorism.135 Nasr argues that sectarianism in Pakistan can be 
contextualized as “militant religio-political activism, whose specific aim is to safeguard 
and promote the socio-political interests of the particular Muslim sectarian 
131 Ahmedis belong to a heretic sect founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, who declared that “Jesus of 
Nazareth had not died on the Cross, nor lifted up to the Heavens but that he was taken off the Cross in a 
wounded condition by his disciples and cured of his wounds, that thereafter he escaped to Kashmir where 
he died a natural death himself.” Later he proclaimed himself to be the promised Messiah. See, “Report of 
the Court of Inquiry: Punjab Disturbances of 1953,” 9–10, http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/
report_1953.pdf.   
132 “Report of the Court of Inquiry: Punjab Disturbances of 1953,” 13, www.thepersecution.org/dl/
report_1953.pdf.  
133 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism 
and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2000): 139, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/313114?origin=JSTOR-pdf. 
134 Ali Riaz, “Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan,” Working Paper No. 85, 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore (August 2005).  
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1057610X.2014.903374.  
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community.”136 He further comments that the goals of this kind of activism are achieved 
through both the mobilization of the sectarian identity in question and the marginalization 
of the rival sectarian community, largely through prolific use of violence.137 Therefore, it 
can be argued that the some of the ROs in Pakistan have been using violence to promote 
the socio-political interests of a particular Muslim community. 
Pakistan is home to some of the most diverse sectarian groups. The two main 
sects are Sunni and Shia; however, there are further subsects within these sects, which are 
equally exclusive and hold extreme views about each other. The graph in Figure 2 depicts 
major sects and subsects in Pakistan:138 
 
Figure 2.  Major Sects and Subsects in Pakistan. 
Several sectarian groups in Pakistan promote extremism by using jihadist 
ideology to motivate their followers to kill people of other sects in the name of God. 
According to them, other sects are heretics that undermine Islam. This kind of idea, based 
on selective selections from Quran and Islamic teachings, contributes to religious 
extremism. The concept of Jihad in Islam entails a much broader perspective of struggle, 
136 Vali R. Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: 
Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998,” Comparative Politics 32, no. 2 (January 2000):171, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/422396. 
137 Ibid.    
138 For more on various sects in Pakistan, see Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, “The New Frontiers: Militancy & 
Radicalism in Pakistan,” Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Report no. 2 (2013). 
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whereas some of the ROs in Pakistan have reduced the concept of jihad as militarized 
struggle for vested interests. Promoting this kind of jihadist ideology as militarized 
struggle through specific verses from the Quran induces extremism in society, which then 
becomes supportive of militant groups. Christine Fair et al. observe that those who 
believe that “jihad is a militarized struggle are 2.3–2.7 percent more supportive of 
policies endorsed by militant groups.”139 Some ROs help in broadening support for 
militant groups by promoting a reductionist jihadist ideology, which thus contributes to 
extremism in society.  
Most scholarly research has remained focused on only one aspect of religious 
organizations—madrasas—whereas the extremist religious organizations have been 
understudied. This chapter will show that extremist religious organizations provide a 
“supporting environment” to terrorists by promoting extremist ideologies in a competitive 
setting for followers.140 Emma Hooper notes that, “it is the failure to address extremism, 
militant, and sectarian violence that has led to a vicious cycle of creeping radicalism, to a 
deeply disturbing extent.”141Therefore, there is a need to broaden our understanding of 
the extremist ROs in Pakistan, which have become breeding grounds for terrorism.142  
This chapter will demonstrate that the ROs in Pakistan have become more 
extreme because they want to maximize their leverage over the population by using 
religious symbols to gain power and money. The ROs operate in a competitive market of 
sectarian ideologies to maximize their supporters who in turn provide them with power 
and money. For these goals, they have adopted extreme ideologies, which are based on 
the exclusion of “others” to monopolize their position on religious matters. This chapter 
is divided into three sections. The first section illustrates a link between religious 
organizations and extremism. The second section discusses the religious organizations in 
139 Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, “Faith or Doctrine?” 
140 Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” 255. 
141 Emma Hooper, “Pakistan: Back to the Future?” Notes International CIDOB 91 (June 2014), 
http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/39500/608345/file/NOTES+91_HOOPER_ANG%282%29.pdf.  
142 Peter Warren Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,” 
Brookings Institution (November 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/11/pakistan-
singer.  
 37 
                                                 
Pakistan with a theoretical approach of rational choice to demonstrate that these 
organizations compete amongst each other for resources. The last section explores how 
the religious organizations also use madrasas to promote militant extremism to achieve 
their objectives. 
A. LINK BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTREMISM 
Martha Crenshaw is a scholar of social sciences at Stanford University who has 
conducted extensive research on terrorism and its causes. She argues that, “in some cases, 
the terrorist organization may be, in effect, a subunit of a legal organization with a large 
public membership.”143 She refers to such terrorist organizations as “extremist offshoots 
of broader social movements or political parties,” which “represent communal or ethnic 
constituency.”144 Therefore, Crenshaw draws a link between some political parties and 
terrorist organizations. Christine Fair observes that there are some religious political 
parties in Pakistan that support terrorist organizations.145 These political parties are: 
Deobandi tanzeems that include Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-
Mujahidin; Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, which include militant wings like Lashkar-e-
Taiba (now called JUD); and Jamaat-e-Islami, which is connected to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and supports Al Badr and Hizbul Mujahidin.146 Similarly, Howenstein also 
points out that the jihadi organizations in Pakistan mainly operate under the aegis of these 
three religious organizations: Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Muslim Brotherhood.147 
These organizations are discussed in the next section. These ROs use religious symbols 
and extremist ideology to mobilize the population in support of militant struggle. 
In a competitive environment where religious differences exist, each ideology can 
provide distinct venues to mobilize support against the system. The disenfranchised 
143 Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Forum 6 
(Fall 1985): 467. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Christine Fair “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 20, no. 1, 49–65, doi: 10.1080/09546550701733996, 49. 
146 Ibid., 49. 
147 Nicholas Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups 
in Pakistan and Kashmir,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Research Report 1 (February 2008).  
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population can be seen as a potential support for the ROs, who fight among each other to 
include this population in their membership to increase their own support base. In other 
words, no religion inherently promotes terrorism, but it can be argued that some ROs in 
Pakistan use religious symbols to attract the parts of the population that are dissatisfied 
with the existing system, a process that results in terrorist activities. The ROs organize 
dissatisfaction among the masses to pursue their vested interests. In doing so, they 
propagate extremist ideologies to radicalize their supporters, who thus develop an affinity 
for terrorism as means to achieve their objectives. We see this happening in Pakistan 
where extremist ROs contribute to terrorism. The following section illustrates how some 
ROs in Pakistan are linked to terrorist groups. 
B. EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN 
Sunni and Shia are the two main sects of Islam; however, there are further 
subsects among Sunnis. The broad subsects of Sunnis in Pakistan are: Barelvis; 
Deobandis; Ahl-e-Hadith; and revivalists such as JI.148 Historically, sects and subsects 
hold extremist views against each other. Some of them promote the killing of the others 
because they believe that the other sects are following and promoting distorted beliefs, 
which is punishable by death. A study conducted by the Pew Research Center finds 
Pakistan among the top ten countries with very high social hostilities involving 
religion.149 Set in such a competitive ideological milieu, the religious organizations strive 
for monopoly over religion because the group that has the monopoly would be the 
legitimate representative of religion in the country. This will provide that group with the 
authority and legitimacy to influence the state to enforce Sharia laws as interpreted by 
that sect, thereby providing that RO with the leverage to gain access to power and money. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Brian J. Grim, “Rising Restrictions on Religion: One-third of the World’s Population Experiences 
an Increase,” Pew Research Center (August 2011): 16–17, http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/
Issues/Government/RisingRestrictions-web.pdf.  
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1. Rise of Religious Extremism in Pakistan 
Before Pakistani Independence, Islamic religious organizations in the sub-
continent—most prominently Jamiat-Ulamai-Hind (JUH) and JI—had opposed the idea 
of a separate state for Muslims. They had opposed creation of Pakistan because they 
“condemned the Muslim League leaders, especially Jinnah, for their ignorance of the 
fundamentals of Islam.”150 Soon after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, the 
religious organizations suddenly abandoned their opposition of the state for an 
opportunity to establish an Islamic state through enforcement of Sharia Law. This was in 
contrast to the rather secular idea of Pakistan envisioned by Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the 
founder of the new state and the man regarded as Quaid-e-Azam (the great leader).151 
Therefore, a competition between the secular and religious identity of the state started 
with the formation of the state. At the time of Independence, JI and JUI were the two 
prominent religious organizations in Pakistan. JI was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-
A’la Mawwdudi in 1941; JUI was essentially a group of Deobandi Ulema, which split 
from JUH in 1945.152 Other religious groups included Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), 
which was formed in 1950 by Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani who was initially part of 
Muslim League (ML), but later created his own party.153 Moreover, various pirs—
individuals from Barelvi sect with large personal followings believing in mystic 
Sufism—were also influential in the religious and political spheres. Despite these 
religious organizations’ prevalence since the Independence, Pakistan did not see much 
religious terrorism until the end of Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s. A report by the 
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre notes that up to 4000 people have died in 
sectarian violence between the mid-1980s and early 2000s.154 Moreover, between 2007 
and 2011, there was a sharp increase in sectarian terrorism that claimed the lives of 1,649 
150 Rizwan Hussain, “Pakistan,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic World, Oxford Islamic Studies 
Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0616.  
151 Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote, 61. 
152 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 3. 
153 Global Security, “Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan,” Global Security.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/pakistan/jup.htm.  
154 Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” 3.  
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people.155 The rise in sectarian terrorism can be connected to the emergence of various 
extremist sectarian organizations that are linked to the ROs mentioned above. The 
following are some selected ones that have connections with some ROs:156  
a. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
TTP is a coalition of FATA based militants who aim to overthrow the Pakistani 
state and enforce the Sharia law of their interpretation. This group uses various terrorist 
tactics, including use of suicide bombings, against security and civilian targets since 
2007. In recent years, it has provided all kinds of support to militants involved with 
Deobandi sectarian organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Jhanhgvi and Ahle Sunnat Wal 
Jamaat. 
b. Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) 
The ASWJ is the new name of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The SSP is an 
extremist Sunni (Deobandi) militant organization that has carried out attacks against 
Shias, whom it believes to be infidels, since 1985. In recent years the SSP has also 
targeted Barelvi groups. This group has also developed strong ties with the TTP. The 
Pakistan government banned the SSP in March 2012 after the rise in sectarian violence. 
c. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 
LeJ, an offshoot of SSP, was established in the 1980s. This is an extremist Sunni 
organization with close links to TTP. LeJ is responsible for sectarian warfare in Karachi 
and attacks against the Shia Hazaras of Baluchistan. This group is also accused of 
assassinating former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007.  
d. Sipah-e-Mohamadi Pakistan (SMP)  
SMP was founded in 1993 to protect the Shia community from extremist Sunni 
militant groups. In 2008–2009, the group resurfaced in the urban centers of Karachi and 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., 4‒5; Dawn News, “Pakistan Bans 25 Militant Organizations,” Dawn, 6 August 2009, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/963704/pakistan-bans-25-militant-organisations.  
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Lahore. SMP has been recently accused of killing prominent Sunni doctors. Allegedly, 
the group receives support and funding from Iran. Four SMP militants were arrested in 
2011 for involvement in a grenade attack against the Saudi Arabian consulate in Karachi. 
e. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) 
LeT was founded in the late 1980s by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed with primary aim 
to aid the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. After the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, this 
group shifted its focus to Jihad in Kashmir. The LeT was banned by the Pakistani 
government in 2002. Consequently, Hafiz Saeed established a charitable foundation 
named JUD; however, it is generally believed that JUD is the new face of LeT, although 
Saeed denies any links with LeT. LeT/JUD follows the Ahle Hadith ideology, which is in 
sync with the Salafist ideology popular in Saudi Arabia.  
f. Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) 
TJP is an offshoot of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafria, a Shia political party 
founded in 1979. The TJP has been banned twice, but continues to operate under different 
names. Its members claim that the organization is essentially a Shia resistance to Sunni 
extremism, but TJP has also been involved in sectarian violence.  
g. Sunni Tehrik (ST) 
ST is a Barelvi militant organization, established in 1982 by Ilyas Qadri. This 
group is believed to be a retaliatory militant wing against sectarian attacks by the ASWJ. 
ST is accused of engaging in turf wars to gain control of the mosques of rival sects 
through land acquisition. 
h. Jandullah 
Jandullah is an anti-Shia militant group, which mostly operates in Baluchistan but 
has ties with LeJ, ASWJ, and TTP. Its militants were accused of killing 40 Shias in a 
bomb blast at Karachi in 2009. Jandullah has also been involved in attacks against state’s 
security forces. 
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2. Alliance between the State and ROs 
In the past, the Pakistani state has made considerable concessions to some ROs to 
gain popular support and to secure its security interests. In return, the ROs have been 
rewarded by the state with money and leeway to increase their followership. These 
allowances to ROs by the state were made for political support and security concerns.157 
The role of state in relation to ROs is discussed in Chapter IV. Similar concessions to 
ROs were made by the state during the Soviet-Afghan War to mobilize support for the 
war.158 In return, the state provided substantial financial support to the “Sunni 
fundamentalists” who had provided assistance to the state during the war, such as JI and 
JUD, which remained the principle beneficiaries of the state’s support.159 This patronage 
from the state made these ROs stronger and they expanded their sphere of influence all 
over the country through the expansion of their madrasas. The expansion of some ROs 
through these resources provided by the state made other religious groups wary of the 
former’s increasing influence. The increased power of some ROs thus created a “security 
dilemma”160 whereby the marginalized ROs felt threatened by the influence of state 
supported ROs. The support provided to some ROs by the state has led to a competitive 
environment among ROs that use extremist ideology to increase their membership, thus 
becoming eligible for resources provided by the state. 
Kfir states that “sectarian groups are quintessentially social groups albeit of a 
religious nature;” furthermore, these social groups attract individuals through common 
identity.161 ROs therefore use religious identity to attract members of the population to 
join them. Individuals who join an RO become eligible to receive benefits from that RO; 
“those not part of the group do not receive support and protection from the group,” writes 
157 Ibid., 188.  
158 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Military and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 373–374. 
159 Ibid., 374; Ullah, Vying For Allah’s Vote, 144. 
160 The term “security dilemma” is borrowed from International Relations Theory as applied to ethnic 
conflicts. See Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and 
Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 2 (2011): 530–532, 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1017/S0260210510000616.   
161 Kfir, “Sectarian Violence,” 458–459. 
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Kfir.162 He argues that the challenge for these religious social groups is that they have to 
prove to their group members that they can “extract concessions from established 
political actors, who will only offer concessions as part of a bargaining process with 
those that pose a threat to them and the state.”163 It can be argued that too many religious 
groups in Pakistan are trying to prove that they can gain concessions from the state. This 
competition for resources and support from the state can turn violent. In Pakistan, various 
ROs have turned violent against each other and against state institutions and civilian 
population to demonstrate their power and influence. This demonstration of violence is 
meant to attract the state’s attention and make the state believe that they are influential 
factors that the state needs to consider in the distribution of resources. 
3. Religious Extremism as a Rational Behavior 
Iannaccone and Berman suggest that religious extremism should be viewed as 
rational behavior. They argue that, “religious producers maximize membership, net 
resources, government support, or some other basic determinant of institutional 
wellbeing.”164 Moreover, they comment that, “the efficiency of sectarian groups at 
politics and organized violence creates the potential for a sect to capture the benefits of 
political monopoly and then violently repress both political and religious opposition.”165 
They conclude that the countries where civil government favors a particular form of 
religious expression are more prone to violent sects because the disfavored sects will be 
“strongly motivated to oppose the government despise the established religion, and covet 
the privileges that come with state support.”166 
Kent D. Miller, in developing a strategic management theory of ROs, argues that 
“religious organizations depend on access to resources from the external 
162 Ibid., 459. 
163 Kfir, “Sectarian Violence,” 459. 
164 Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Deadly,” Public Choice 128(1/2) (2006): 109–129, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026636?origin=JSTOR-
pdf.  
165 Ibid., 123. 
166 Ibid., 126. 
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environment.”167 He further elaborates that the resources are not limited to physical and 
financial assets, but also include “the number of adherents and their levels of time, 
commitment, and effort.”168 Therefore, it can be argued that the ROs endeavor to increase 
their membership and get access to material resources. The competitive environment—
such as the one in Pakistan—where too many ROs are fighting to maximize their 
membership and seeking material benefits, the competition leads to violent acts. Such 
violence by a particular RO is meant to demonstrate to the state that it needs to 
acknowledge the strength of the RO and must meet its demands. Violence assures its 
followers that the RO will protect the interests of its members at any cost. 
C. THE USE OF MADRASAS 
The extremist ROs in Pakistan use madrasas to increase their membership. In 
doing so, the extremist ROs teach their extremist ideologies to the students who mostly 
take up religious positions in society after graduation from the madrasas. The link 
between madrasas and terrorism has been denied by some scholars on the basis of 
empirical research. This section will demonstrate that such empirical research has serious 
limitations, which does not mean that this connection should not be analyzed carefully 
when informing policy.  
Madrasas have existed in Muslim societies for centuries. One of the first 
madrasas, called Nizamiyah, was established in Baghdad in the eleventh century A.D.169 
After that, it spread to other regions that came under the rule of Muslims. Christopher M. 
Blanchard observes that though “their curricula varied from place to place, it was always 
religious in character because these schools ultimately were intended to prepare future 
Islamic religious scholars (ulama) for their work.”170 These madrasas not only delivered 
religious education, but also provided free room and board for the students.171 Riaz notes 
167 Kent D. Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations,” Strategic Management 
Journal 23, no. 5 (May 2002): 438, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094476?origin=JSTOR-pdf.  
168 Ibid., 438–439. 




                                                 
that the network of madrasas became institutionalized in 1959 under the aegis of four 
ideological schools: Ahl-e-Hadith formed Wafaq-al-Madaris-al-Salafia; Deobandis 
created Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabai; Brelvis set up Tanzim-al-Madaris Arabai; and the 
Shias were grouped under the Majlis-e-Nazarat-e shiah Madaris-e-Arabiah (currently 
known as Wafaq-al-Madaris (Shia) Pakistan).172 Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora 
Khattak and Jamia Binoria Town at Karachi were the earliest of established madrasas, 
which belonged to Deobandi ideology.173 The number of these Deobandi madrasas 
increased over the time and it is believed that since the 1980s, Pakistan has experienced 
an exponential growth in the number of madrasas.  
During this time, the curricula of madrasas became more radicalized by the ROs 
that ran them. Ahmed states that “a study conducted by Patrick Belton shows how 
textbooks developed at the University of Nebraska-Omaha and published by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) were used to encourage and 
justify the ‘holy war’ against the Soviets.”174 Nasr, on the other hand, argues that the 
radicalization of madrasas started in mid-1970s as a consequence of the proliferation of 
madrasas belonging to Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i Hadith schools of Sunni Islam.175  
At the same time, under the leadership of Abul Ala Mowdudi, JI started its 
venture in politics.176 Riaz argues that the political situation of Pakistan in 1977 “created 
opportunities for the marginalized ulemas (religious clerics) to return to the limelight 
through the political parties.”177 The Deobandi political party—JUD—and the 
revivalists—JI—used madrasas under their influence to provide foot soldiers for street 
agitation.178 Thus, the madrasas became instruments of these religious organizations to 
172 Riaz, “Global Jihad,” 14. 
173 Zainab Shahab Ahmed, “Madrasa Education in the Pakistani Context: Challenges, Reforms and 
Future Directions,” South Asian Journal of Peace Building 2, no. 1 (Autumn 2009): 2. 
174 Ahmed, “Madrasa Education in the Pakistani Context,” 3. 
175 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism 
and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2000): 139, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/313114.  
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., 15. 
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achieve their religious and political objectives. During the same time, Pakistan and the 
U.S. got involved in the Soviet-Afghan War and co-opted various ROs to mobilize their 
madrasa students as mujahedeen to fight against the Soviet “infidels” in Afghanistan. 
The leaders of these ROs competed for the resources being provided by the government. 
Riaz states that: 
The Government-controlled Zakat Fund and U.S. money was the prize 
they (leaders of ROs) went after, but to increase their shares of the pie 
they had to marginalize their opponents ideologically, dwarf them 
numerically, and if necessary, annihilate them physically. All of these 
required foot soldiers and the madrassahs became the recruiting centre 
with these objectives in view.179 
Therefore, it can be argued that because the ROs compete for resources, they 
promote extreme ideologies that lead to violence and acts of terrorism. Such ideologies 
are stimulated in madrasas, but some scholars have opposed the idea that madrasas 
promote extremism and terrorism. Mark Sageman, Peter Bergen, and Alan Krueger find 
that most of the terrorists are educated in non-madrasa institutions.180 Their research is 
based mostly on the data related to international terrorism that directly affects the West. 
Therefore, they ignore the link between madrasas and extremist terrorism in Pakistan, 
which is a serious security challenge not only for Pakistan, but also for the larger spheres 
of regional and international security. Christine Fair, who has worked extensively on 
Islamic education in Pakistan, argues that: 
Prior to concluding that madaris are irrelevant to militant recruitment in 
the region or otherwise unimportant, there is strong evidence that many—
but by no means all—of Pakistan’s suicide attackers and sectarian 
militants do come from madaris.181 
179 Riaz, “Global Jihad,” 17. 
180 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004); Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “The Economics and the Education of Suicide 
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Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 117–125. 
181 Christine Fair, “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” Terrorism and Political 
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Moreover, in a study conducted by Fair in Afghanistan in 2007, she states that, 
“the preponderance of suicide attackers in Afghanistan who come from Pakistan appears 
to be recruited from madaris in Pakistan’s tribal belt.”182 
The role of madrasas as a breeding ground for extremism is thus evident from 
above discussion. The extremist ROs, which run these madrasas, use them to mobilize 
their students and teachers to demonstrate their power against rival factions. They also 
use their students to fight wars and become militants because such activities provide the 
extremist ROs with economic benefits from the state. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Islam as a religion does not promote violence;183 however, this chapter shows that 
some ROs in Pakistan use religious symbols to promote extremism. ROs in Pakistan have 
existed since the creation of the country. Yet during the mid-1970s, there was an 
exponential rise in creation of new ROs on the basis of sectarianism. This increase in the 
number of sectarian ROs, coupled with the funding of some ROs from foreign countries 
and the Pakistani government, is related to the increase in violence and terrorism within 
the country. Such a relationship suggests that the ROs in Pakistan operate in a 
competitive environment where each RO strives to claim monopoly over religion. The 
ROs can be seen as rational actors, which want to maximize their benefits in terms of 
demanding resources from the state, increase their membership, and marginalize their 
competitors. To maximize their benefits, some ROs resort to extreme measures, including 
the use of violence and the promotion of extremism in society. Madrasas provide foot 
soldiers to the extremist ROs, which carry out acts of violence to prove that they are a 
significant factor and that the state must respond to their demands. Understanding these 
ROs in the context of rational actors, which are trying to compete in a market of 
ideologies, is therefore necessary to comprehend why and how these ROs promote 
extremism in the society. This understanding is important in formulating policies to 
counter extremism in Pakistan. The role of the state in favoring one sect can exacerbate 
182 Ibid., 62. 
183 Sultan M. Hali, “No Place for Extremism & Religious Intolerance in Islam,” Criterion 6, no. 2 
(April 2011): 121–154, http://search.proquest.com/docview/918709657?accountid=12702.  
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the situation because the other sects feel marginalized and disenfranchised. They also feel 
threatened by the growing influence of the favored sect and thus take up violent measures 
to protect their interests and seek resources from the state. The support for these ROs 
comes from people who are dissatisfied with the existing system. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of the state in providing social and economic support to its people can limit 
the membership of these extremist ROs. The role of state in relation to the extremist ROs 
is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF STATE IN RELATION TO ROS 
Once religion occupies center stage, it is indeed difficult to sideline those 
who profess to be the guardians of the faith. 
–Gilles Boquerat and Nazir Hussain 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will look at the relations between the state and ROs and will 
illustrate that the Pakistani state has needed ROs to mobilize support from the society 
from 1947 when it became independent. Since ROs have the power to garner street 
support though their social organizing, they have been able to bargain with the state, 
which has needed their support for political reasons. This chapter will use five examples 
to illustrate use of ROs by the state since 1947: the use of religious identity to mobilize 
population during creation of Pakistan; accepting the demands of ROs during the 
formative years of the country; the Islamic character of 1973 Constitution and passing of 
legislation in 1974 to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslims; use of ROs by General Zia-ul-
Haq to legitimize his military rule and fight a proxy war in Afghanistan against the 
Soviets in 1980s, as well as implementing Sharia Law through Hudood Ordinance in 
1979; and use of ROs to legitimize the rule under General Pervez Musharraf in 2002. 
This chapter will illustrate that the state’s dependence on ROs for political needs has led 
to the expansion of extremist policies by the state, which contribute to overall toleration 
of extremism in the country. Such policies exclude minority religions and sects; 
therefore, these groups feel marginalized and resort to violence in order to protect their 
rights. 
B. USE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND ROs FOR POLITICAL PURPOSE 
1. Pre-independence Era: 1937–1947 
Religion has played a prominent role in the Pakistan Movement, which was led by 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his party All India Muslim League (AIML). During the 
struggle for independence from the British, leaders of AIML had used religious identity 
to mobilize population. During the famous Lahore session of Muslim League in March 
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1940, Muhammad Ali Jinnah stated, “The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two 
different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures.”184 Therefore, according 
to Jinnah there was a need to create a separate homeland for the Muslims in the shape of 
Pakistan.  
A careful analysis of the Pakistan movement and the leaders associated with it 
reveals that religious identity was used by the leaders of AIML for political reasons. 
Christophe Jaffrelot, a French political scientist specializing in South Asia, notes: 
Jinnah and most of his lieutenants were not religious, but they used Islam 
as a focus for an evocation of nationalism, playing on its emotional power 
to gain the attention of the Muslim in the streets. Thus, Islam became a 
lingua franca which allowed the establishment of a front combining the 
Muslims in ‘minority’ situations with those in Punjab. In the 1946 
elections, the League won a majority in the province with 75 seats 
compared with just ten for the Unionists.185 
Similarly, Leonard Binder, a distinguished professor of political science, notes 
that “after the elections of 1936, even the greater efforts were made to win over the 
‘ulemā’, this time on the Pakistan platform and the slogan of an Islamic state.”186 Jinnah 
needed support from ulema to strengthen his political position; therefore, he managed to 
secure backing from JUH, an organization of Indian religious scholars.187 JUH provided 
Jinnah with requisite support against JI, which had been portraying him as secular and 
un-Islamic.188 Against the opposition from JI, Jinnah therefore needed support from 
religious scholars to strengthen his political position as a leader of the Muslims. It is 
therefore clear that during the Pakistan movement, religious identity had been used by the 
leaders to garner support for political reasons. 
184 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without A Nation (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 2004), 
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2. Formative Years of Pakistan 
After the creation of Pakistan, the subsequent governments and political parties 
have been using religious identity to amass public support. Using religious symbols and 
support from the ROs provide them legitimacy to be the representatives of a 
predominantly Muslim population. During the formative years of Pakistan, Pakistan 
Muslim League (PML), the new face of AIML after the independence of Pakistan, was 
the major representative political party. The central leaders of AIML came from Muslim 
minority provinces. Khalid Bin Sayeed, a renowned Pakistani political scientist notes in 
his book, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948: “There was a feeling of 
uneasiness, sometimes bordering on resentment among the leaders of the Muslim 
majority provinces that the AIML was dominated by leaders from the Muslim minority 
provinces.”189 Therefore, the PML leadership lacked a popular base in the Muslim 
majority provinces.190 The PML leaders had to compete with the local leaders that joined 
PML a decade before independence; these local leaders were significant contenders of 
power having strongholds in provinces in the new country.191 Dr. Kausar Parveen, a 
lecturer at Punjab University Lahore, argues that, “being insecure and apprehensive, the 
PML leadership relied on the name of Islam to save them and to unite the nation in the 
face of gigantic problems.”192 Lack of political base for the leaders of PML in the newly 
created country therefore, compelled the leaders to use religious symbols to gather 
support against potential contenders of power. 
The PML, in an attempt to consolidate power and bring unity among the diverse 
ethnic population of the newly formed country, used Islamic identity as a gelling agent. 
In doing so, they had to win over ROs for their support. This was achieved by 
acquiescing to the demand of ROs to declare Pakistan an Islamic state and make all laws 
189 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 206. 
190 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (New York: Houndmills, St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000), 4. 
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Resolution,” 144–145. 
192 Ibid., 145. 
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in accordance with the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. The Objectives Resolution of 
1949 was the first manifestation of state’s appeasement of the ROs.193 The demand for 
making Pakistan an Islamic state came from the Ulema in the Government (i.e., Maulana 
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the President of the JUI, Pir of Manki Sharif in the NWFP, 
Maulana Akram Khan, the President of the East Pakistan Provincial Muslim League, and 
outside the government, JI.194 The First Constituent Assembly, despite opposition by the 
minorities represented by the Pakistan National Congress (PNC), accepted the demands 
of ROs in the shape of the Objectives Resolution, which was approved in March 1949.195 
Tasneem Kausar, a scholar of constitutional law and political science, claims that, “in 
retrospect, it can be argued that this document was the outcome of intense pressurizing by 
the Ulema who started mobilizing the public to hold the government accountable for 
backing off from its commitment to ‘make Pakistan a fortress of Islam.’”196 The political 
leaders accepted the demands of ROs to make Pakistan an Islamic state; this was done to 
rally the support from ROs, which had the ability to mobilize population. 
The provisions of Objectives Resolution, as predicted by the minority party, PNC 
had the potential to marginalize the minorities and contribute toward extremism in the 
society. As pointed out by Bhupendra Kumar Datta, a PNC member at the time, “the 
religious clauses of Objectives Resolution would condemn the minorities ‘forever to an 
inferior status.’”197 He further argued that “without a legitimate right to share power, the 
minorities would taste neither democracy, nor freedom, nor equality, nor social justice; 
they would merely be tolerated.”198 Dr. Kausar argues that “this not only resulted in the 
193 The Objectives Resolution of 1949 provided the basic guidelines for formulating the constitution 
of the newly created state of Pakistan. Objectives Resolution demanded that all laws of the country must be 
made in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The 1973 constitution was formulated under these broad 
guidelines, but it explicitly included clauses related to Islamic character of the state and declared that Sharia 
laws were to be implemented in the country. The Hudood Ordinance of 1983 implemented Sharia law as 
interpreted by the Sunni Sect. See James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York: Infobase 
Publishing, 2009): 171, 207, 216. 
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increasing insecurities and anxieties of the minorities but inflamed the sectarian 
differences within the Muslim community itself.”199 It can therefore be argued that by 
ceding to the demands of ROs, to include exclusionary clauses that marginalized 
minorities, the government inadvertently paved the way for exclusionary politics based 
on religious identity. 
3. The Constitution of 1973 
The Constitution of 1973 was the first constitution passed by an elected body. 
Previously, the 1956 Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, which was 
not an elected body; the 1962 Constitution was passed by the Constitution Committee 
appointed by the military ruler, General Ayub Khan. Therefore, the first-ever democratic 
parliament crafted the 1973 Constitution, which declared Pakistan as an Islamic republic. 
Part IX, Article 227 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that all existing laws 
shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah.200 The religious clauses included in the constitution have since made 
religion a politically potent force. This has allowed the political leaders in Pakistan to use 
religion for political legitimacy and national integration.201 Dr. Arshi Hashmi, a Pakistani 
expert on religious radicalism and militancy, argues that “political use of religion has 
heightened religious antagonism and acrimony, besides creating space for religious 
militancy and extremism.202 
To understand the Islamic character of 1973 Constitution, passed by a left-leaning 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), it may be useful to review political environment of the 
time. In 1970, the first-ever general elections were held in Pakistan in which PPP, led by 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was pitched against PML and JI; “the two leading political parties 
199 Ibid., 157. 
200 Arshi Saleem Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” Institute of Peace and 





                                                 
emphasizing religious identity and agendas.”203 In the elections, Bhutto’s PPP won 81 of 
the 138 seats in West Pakistan, but lost in East Pakistan where Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rehman’s Awami League won 160 of 162 seats.204 The subsequent power struggle 
between Bhutto and Mujib led to the secession of East Pakistan in December 1971. The 
separation of East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in December 1971, came also 
with an embarrassing surrender of 90,000 military troops stationed at Bangladesh. 
Bhutto, however, had become the new prime minister of Pakistan, and he had to face 
tremendous opposition especially from ROs that used secession of East Pakistan to 
mobilize masses against him. They claimed that because of Bhutto’s wrong policies, 
Pakistan had lost its eastern wing, which was a blow to the two nation theory.205 The ROs 
at the time advocated that the only way to save rest of the country was to use Islam as the 
gelling agent. Bhutto, who had started his political career as a socialist, also started using 
religious symbols to gain legitimacy amid growing opposition from religious parties.206 
Riaz Hussain observes that “Bhutto used emotive religious phrases like Musawat-i-
Muhammad (the equality of Muhammad) and Islami Musawat (Islamic equality) as part 
of his political rhetoric to justify and win mass support for the socialist policies of his 
government.” He further argues that “as anti-government agitation led by the Pakistan 
National Alliance (PNA)—whose leaders used Islam to mobilize people against Bhutto’s 
government—flared up in the main urban centers the government sought to defuse the 
situation by announcing ‘Islamic’ reforms.”207 Asghar Ali Engineer, an Islamic scholar 
from India, notes that, “though Bhutto was a modernist …, he used religion to appease 
the bigoted religious leadership of Pakistan to buy time and to stabilize his regime.208 
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Thus, Bhutto and his government made considerable concession to the ROs’s demands to 
include religious clauses in the constitution.  
4. 1974 Constitutional Amendment Declaring Ahmedis as Non-Muslims 
By 1974, Bhutto was facing daunting political challenges that led him to make 
concessions after concessions to the ROs. He was facing political opposition from Wali 
Khan’s National Awami Party (NAP) and tribal leaders in Baluchistan such as Nawab 
Akbar Bugti. The ROs had joined in with the opposition, which had increased their 
strength. Bhutto, therefore, had to address the demands by ROs. One such demand, which 
had remained pending since the 1950s, was to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslims. In April 
1974, clashes between Ahmedis and members of ROs erupted in Rabwa, which were 
used by the ROs to put further pressure on the government to declare them non-Muslims. 
Bhutto referred the issue to the National Assembly, which approved the bill declaring 
Ahmedis as non-Muslims. Bhutto himself did not attend the 30-day-long debate on the 
bill, but during the final vote, he voted in favor of the bill. In addition to declaring 
Ahmedis as non-Muslims, this bill stipulated that they could not hold higher positions in 
public offices. Therefore, it was significant in way that it accepted the demands of ROs to 
exclude a minority group from being an equal member of the society. The acceptance of 
this bill, when viewed in correct political context of the time, suggests that the 
government adopted exclusionary policies to appease the growing political opposition of 
which ROs were a part. 
5. Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization of the Country 
General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977 as a result of violent protests by the 
opposition under the banner of the PNA. ROs had provided street support to PNA 
through their followers. They considered Bhutto’s socialist policies as un-Islamic; 
therefore, they had joined hands with the opposition political parties. Zia-ul-Haq had 
understood the significance of ROs in political landscape. Being a devout religious 
person himself, Zia used religion to strengthen his support base. In doing so, he made 
considerable concessions to ROs, such as JI, which was the most influential RO at the 
time. Hashmi states, “The Jamat-e-Islami was of critical importance to Zia. It was the 
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only party with a committed cadre of loyalists that stood in readiness to counter and blunt 
any anti-Zia agitation launched by any political force.”209 She further argues, “None of 
the two sides had a purely religious goal—it was more a matter of gaining legitimacy 
among the public than anything else.”210 Support for ROs by Zia for political purpose is 
thus clear. 
At the same time, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1980, which was 
considered by Zia as a security challenge to Pakistan. To address Soviet question, Zia 
decided to use religiously motivated mujahideen to fight against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. In order to reach out to the religiously motivated people to fight a war in 
Afghanistan, the Zia government co-opted ROs to do what was needed. This further 
strengthened the ties between the state and the ROs, which were given huge amounts of 
weapons and money to fight a war against communism on behalf of Pakistan and U.S.211 
While the war was going on in Afghanistan, ROs had raised their demands to enforce 
Sharia Law, which was promised by the 1973 Constitution. To maintain the allegiance of 
ROs, Zia set up a Federal Shariat Court, which was given “the power to strike down any 
law or administrative action as un-Islamic—if it violated the fundamental laws of 
Islam.”212 Other measures to enforce Sharia laws were also taken, which included Islamic 
punishments (i.e., amputation of hands for theft, stoning to death and lashing for adultery 
and drinking); the revised education policy of 1979, which laid special emphasis on the 
projection of Islamic teaching and ideology of Pakistan in the syllabi of various classes; 
liberal funds were made available for religious education; and a compulsory tax—
Zakat—(2.5 percent annual deduction from savings accounts and other investments).213 
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Hasan Askari Rizvi, a Pakistani political scientist and military analyst, argues, “The 
Islamization process had its problems. A number of Muslim sects who did not share the 
establishment’s perspective on Islam resented the lack of adequate attention to their 
religious sensitivities.”214 For example, the members of Shia sect staged a massive protest 
in Islamabad in the summer of 1980 against the compulsory deduction of ‘Zakat’ by the 
government.215 “The government fearing the protest might trigger agitation in other 
cities, with political parties jumping on the bandwagon, gave in and made ‘Zakat’ 
voluntary for the Shia sect.”216 Askari argues that the exclusionary policies of the Zia’s 
Islamization process has led to “tension between the Shias and one of the most 
conservative Sunni sect—the Wahabis. Similarly the Wahabi-Barelvi differences have 
become pronounced.”217 Therefore, when Zia was trying to appease the ROs, he had to 
make concessions to them in the form of implementation of Sharia law, which was based 
on the interpretation by a particular sect. This created strife between the dominant 
Wahabi-Deobandi sects and the rest of the sects. Husain Haqqani argues that “[o]ne 
faction of the Jamiat Ulema Islam comprising clerics from the influential Deobandi 
school joined in the distribution of charity received from Arab countries and in setting up 
madrassas.”218 During the period of Soviet Afghan War, Deobandi ROs received 
considerable amount of financial support from the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, which 
enabled them to increase their influence in the society through charity and networks of 
madrassas. It may be worth mentioning here that Zia’s personal ideology was in sync 
with the Deobandi ideology, and therefore, most of the Islamization process 
predominantly followed the Deobandi ideology. Hashmi observes that, “with a number of 
sects and varied types of ‘Islam,’ the Deobandi school of thought became the official 
school to research theoretical explanations.”219 Zia preferred one particular sect for 
interpretation and implementation of Sharia; this led to marginalization of other sects. It 
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can be argues that Zia’s policy was exclusionary of minor sects and religions, therefore, 
further aggravated the sectarian strife and promoted extremism. 
6. General Pervez Musharraf and ROs 
As discussed previously, the state has made concessions to ROs that led to 
extremist policies adopted by the state. On the other hand, rulers like Musharraf that had 
tried to marginalize ROs and propose liberal policies have resulted in strong opposition 
from the influential ROs. General Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999 because of a 
bloodless coup d’état against then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf introduced 
the concept of “enlightened moderation,” which demanded the “Muslim world to shun 
militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift.”220 He wanted to 
de-radicalize the Pakistani society by promoting more liberal and tolerant policies. As a 
first step he proposed a minor amendment in the blasphemy law.221 He further proposed 
changes in the Hudood Ordinance; these changes were aimed at providing protection to 
rape victims. In addition, he banned the militant outfits and associated welfare 
organizations of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed (JEM).222 His efforts, however, angered the 
religious groups and ROs, which successfully compelled him to retreat from the proposed 
amendments. Such efforts to amend the religious laws provided the ROs with an 
opportunity to increase their propaganda against the government, which was already 
experiencing violent acts of terrorism for its support of the U.S. war on terror. Further 
fuel to fire against Musharraf came because of operations against militants who had taken 
control of Lal Masjid (red mosque) in the country’s capital city of Islamabad.223 These 
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actions against the extremist groups weakened the political support for Musharraf, while 
on the other hand strengthened the propaganda of extremist elements. His actions against 
extremist outfits resulted in three attacks on his life. He survived two terrorist attacks 
aimed to kill him; a third was averted.224 Musharraf was being portrayed as a “supporting 
agenda of enemies of Islam under the smart title of ‘enlightened moderation.”225 On the 
one hand, Musharraf was supported by the Western powers including the United States; 
on the other hand, he lost support from a larger base that was mobilized against him by 
the ROs using religion as the driving force. He could not succeed in his anti-extremist 
policies. His government’s kinetic actions against militants resulted in increased terrorist 
attacks and further radicalization. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that religion has been used for political reasons 
even during the creation of the country. Subsequently, most of the governments have 
used religion for political gains for which they had to make concessions to the ROs. This 
in turn has led the state to accept demands of ROs to adopt policies that lead to 
extremism in society. 
The problem of religious extremism in Pakistan has become complex. Pakistan is 
an Islamic state and its constitution should reflect that; however, the constitutional role of 
religion has created space for extremist ROs to prosper and promote extremism in 
society. Implementation of Shariah law is contested per se; various sects have different 
interpretations of Shariah law, therefore, adopting an interpretation of one sect has 
resulted in violent response from others. Hashmi argues: 
With a number of sects and varied types of “Islam,” the Deobandi school 
of thought became the official school to look up to for theoretical 
explanations. With its close resemblance to Saudi Wahabism, Saudi 
224 Bill Roggio, “Assassination Attempt against Pakistan’s President,” Long War Journal, 6 July 
2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/apparent_assassinati.php.  
225 Abid Ullah Jan, The Musharraf Factor: Leading Pakistan to Inevitable Demise (Canada: 
Pragmatic Publishing, 2005), 47.  
 61 
                                                 
Arabia became the patronizing factor, even though a majority of 
Pakistanis was and still adhere to the Brelvi/Sufi tradition of Islam.226 
The ambiguity in implementing a version of Shariah law has therefore become a 
cause of extremism. Thomas Jefferson wrote, “When principles are well understood, their 
application is less embarrassing,” whereas, in the case of Pakistan, the ambiguities 
remain. Hasan Askari Rizvi argues, “A number of Muslim sects who did not share the 
establishment’s perspective on Islam resented the lack of adequate attention to their 
religious sensitivities.”227   
Attempts to change the clauses in the constitution that have the potential to be 
used against minorities have been responded to with violence by extremist ROs. 
Musharraf’s efforts to marginalize ROs and take action against the extremist ROs have 
further increased the intensity of violence by the extremist groups. Therefore, any policy 
to counter extremism in Pakistan will have to be cognizant of reactions by the ROs, 
which have become a formidable challenge for the state. 
226 Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” 6. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has demonstrated that ROs in Pakistan have a socio-economic link 
with society through the provision of public goods and welfare to society. Members of 
society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these 
institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to 
the political and social context in the country that forces them to compete for resources 
using Islamist extremism. They then use this socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens 
with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of terrorism as a 
justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs to mobilize society for their interests, 
such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass extremist 
laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable segment 
of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for the state’s 
interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that require 
adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which further contribute to extremism. 
The second chapter demonstrated that ROs in Pakistan have a history of carrying 
out social services and helping the poor. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the state 
sponsored a particular sect, which marginalized other sects. This action had a profound 
effect on the conduct of ROs, who thus became competitive in expanding their influence 
on society. The case of JI and JUD are instructive, for understanding that in order to 
increase their influence, the ROs have engaged in social services. JI and JUD have 
expansive welfare networks all over the country. They have been able to provide social 
and welfare services in the areas where the government has been unable to provide such 
services. These ROs have maintained their link with the poor. Their influence on the poor 
provides them with the leverage necessary to gain concessions and resources from the 
state. Therefore, the ROs remain engaged in competitive welfare activities to increase 
their influence over segments of society belonging to lower and lower-middle classes. It 
is important to understand the link between religious organizations and the poor to further 
our understanding of the dependence of the state on religious groups to mobilize the poor. 
The state has been unable to meet the basic social needs of the poor, and therefore, the 
 63 
poor have become disenfranchised by the state and come under the influence of religious 
organizations. This situation benefits ROs, for they can bargain for compensation from 
the state. By realizing the link between the poor and ROs, the state can form policies to 
address the social requisites of the poor in order to weaken the power base of ROs. Some 
of these ROs have adopted extremist ideologies and because they maintain influence over 
society through socio-welfare networks, they promote extremism in society. 
Chapter III illustrated that some ROs in Pakistan use religious symbols to promote 
extremism. ROs in Pakistan have existed since the creation of the country. Yet during the 
mid-1970s, there was an exponential rise in creation of new ROs on the basis of 
sectarianism. This increase in the number of sectarian ROs, coupled with the funding of 
some ROs from foreign countries and the Pakistani government, is related to the increase 
in violence and terrorism within the country. Such a relationship suggests that the ROs in 
Pakistan operate in a competitive environment where each RO strives to claim a 
monopoly over religion. The ROs can be seen as rational actors who want to maximize 
their benefits in terms of demanding resources from the state, increase their membership, 
and marginalize their competitors. To maximize their benefits, some ROs resort to 
extreme measures, including the use of violence and the promotion of extremism in 
society. Madrasas provide foot soldiers to the extremist ROs, which carry out acts of 
violence to prove that they are a significant factor and that the state must respond to their 
demands. Understanding these ROs in the context of rational actors who are trying to 
compete in a market of ideologies is therefore necessary to comprehend why and how 
these ROs promote extremism in the society. This understanding is important in 
formulating policies to counter extremism in Pakistan. The role of the state in favoring 
one sect can exacerbate the situation because the other sects feel marginalized and 
disenfranchised. They also feel threatened by the growing influence of the favored sect 
and thus take up violent measures to protect their interests and seek resources from the 
state. The support for these ROs comes from people who are dissatisfied with the existing 
system. Therefore, the effectiveness of the state in providing social and economic support 
to its people can limit the membership of these extremist ROs. 
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Chapter IV illustrated that religion has been used for political reasons even during 
the creation of the country. Subsequently, most of the governments used religion for 
political gains for which they had to make concessions to the ROs. This in turn has led 
the state to accept demands of ROs to adopt policies that lead to extremism in society. 
The problem of religious extremism in Pakistan has become complex. Pakistan is 
an Islamic state and its constitution should reflect that; however, the availability of 
resources for Islamist activities has created space for competition among ROs who 
prosper and promote extremism in society. Implementation of Shariah law is contested 
per se; various sects have different interpretations of Shariah law; therefore, adopting the 
interpretation of one sect has resulted in violent responses from others. Attempts to 
change the clauses in the constitution that have the potential to be used against minorities 
have been responded to with violence by extremist ROs. Musharraf’s efforts to 
marginalize ROs and take action against the extremist ROs further increased the intensity 
of violence by the extremist groups. Therefore, any policy to counter extremism in 
Pakistan will have to be cognizant of reactions by the ROs, which have become a 
formidable challenge for the state. 
This thesis has illustrated that when the state relies on ROs for political 
expediency it contributes to extremism. ROs in Pakistan have gained considerable 
influence over the society, which allows them to promote extremism. The state has 
depended on ROs for political reasons, which has led it to adopt exclusionary policies to 
appease ROs. Such policies marginalize minority religions and sects, which resort to 
violence to attract attention of the state. Therefore, in order to get rid of extremism in 
Pakistan, the state needs to adopt policies that do not provide patronage to selective ROs. 
Following are recommended in this regard: 
• Lack of governance provides ROs with the space to maintain links with 
the poor and disenfranchised population through their socio-welfare 
activities. This provides them with the influence over a sizeable 
population, which enables them to bargain with the state. Therefore, the 
Pakistani state needs to ensure that its citizens are provided with social 
goods and services. This will eliminate the cause of influence that ROs 
have over the society. On the other hand, this will provide legitimacy to 
the government for which it needs support of ROs. 
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• The state needs to distance itself from patronage of selective ROs. In the 
past, this has led to competition among ROs that have adopted extremist 
ideologies to compete for money and power. 
• Some of the ROs have links with terrorist outfits. The state needs to 
closely monitor the activities of ROs to identify those ROs that have links 
to the terrorists. This will be possible only if the government keeps itself 
neutral and does not provide patronage to selective ROs. 
• With regard to academic research, this thesis has highlighted that there is a 
lack of empirical data to gauge the influence of ROs on the society. 
Therefore, in order to better understand the role of ROs in promoting 
extremism, an empirical research is warranted to measure the influence of 
ROs over the society. 
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